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Abstract
In Chapter 1, co-authored with Amir Kermani we ask the following question: can an increase
in the supply of credit induce a boom and bust in house prices and real economic activity?
This paper exploits the federal preemption of national banks from local anti-predatory laws
to gauge the causal e¤ect of the supply of credit on the real economy. Specically, we exploit
the heterogeneity in the market share of national banks across counties as of 2003, as well as
heterogeneity in states anti-predatory laws to instrument for the outward shift in the supply of
credit. We rst show that if we compare counties in the top versus the bottom decile of presence
of national banks in states with anti-predatory laws, the preemption regulation resulted in an
11% increase in annual loan issuance. Our estimates show that to such an increase in annual
loan issuance correspond a 12% total increase in house prices and a 2% increase in employment
in the non-tradable sectors, followed by a bust of similar magnitude in the subsequent years.
Finally we show that the increase in the supply of credit reduced mortgagesdelinquency rates
during the boom years, but resulted in higher delinquency rates during the bust years.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Marcin Kacperczyk we investigate the e¤ect of the zero-
bound interest rate policy on money market funds industry. We nd that, as the Fed funds
rate approaches zero bound, money funds display reaching for yield incentives in that they
invest in riskier asset classes and hold less diversied portfolios. The reduction in interest
rates also increases the likelihood of funds exiting the market and lowers expenses funds charge
to investors. Consistent with the reputation concerns at stake, we nd that funds a¢ liated
with large nancial institutions are more likely to exit the market while funds managed by
independent asset management companies take on relatively more risk. Additional evidence
from the Feds forward guidance policy corroborates the ndings.
In Chapter 3, co-authored with Marshall Van Allstyne we ask the following question: what
drives workers to seek information from their peers? And how does communication a¤ect
employee performance? We address these questions using an original panel data set that in-
cludes all accesses to an information-sharing platform, together with performance measures of
all loan o¢ cers at a major commercial bank. We show that low skill agents benet the most
from consuming othersinformation. Moreover, we provide evidence that job rotation destroys
specialized human capital, such as soft information about local borrowers. Finally, by instru-
menting the demand for information with the exogenous variation arising from di¤erences in
social norms among branches, we are able to assess the causal e¤ect of information sharing on
performance.
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Chapter 1
Credit-Induced Boom and Bust
1
1 Introduction
The Great Recession was preceded by a large expansion of credit and followed by a collapse
in housing prices and consumption, which took more than three years to return to its level
just prior to the recession. The resulting employment decline experienced during the Great
Recession was greater than that of any recession of recent decades, with unemployment peak-
ing at 10% in October 2009. What is the role of nancial markets in generating these severe
uctuations? Specically, does an outward shift in the credit supply during the expansionary
phase of the business cycle explain the observed disruptions in the real economy?
This paper investigates how an increase in credit supply to riskier borrowers is responsible
for the boom and bust cycle in housing prices and economic outcomes observed during
the Great Recession. This question is important for understanding how nancial markets
a¤ect the real side of the economy and how the supply of credit might amplify uctuations.
However, identifying the causal e¤ect of credit is challenging because of omitted variables
and reverse causality. The latter concern is especially important: counties that experience
higher growth are going to increase their consumption and drive house prices up, but are also
going to have higher demand for credit. As a result, house price and employment increases
will be strongly correlated with the supply of credit, even if credit has no direct e¤ect on
house prices and consumption.
In this paper we attempt to estimate the causal e¤ect of an increase in credit supply
on economic outcomes by taking advantage of important changes to banking regulation
in the U.S. during the early 2000s. In particular, starting in 1999 several states adopted
anti-predatory laws (APL) that implemented several restrictions on the terms of mortgage
loans to riskier borrowers, such as requiring verication of borrowers repayment ability,
as well as including limits on fees, rates and prepayment penalties. However, in 2004 the
Bush administration through the O¢ ce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in an
e¤ort to increase home ownership, enacted a preemption rule, which barred the application
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of state anti-predatory laws to national banks. In other words, national banks and their
mortgage lending subsidiaries became exempt from state anti-predatory lending laws and
state enforcement. In contrast, mortgage brokers and independent non-depository lenders,
along with state-chartered depository institutions and their subsidiaries, were required to
comply with the provisions in state anti-predatory lending laws.
This setting o¤ers a great opportunity to exploit variation across states and across dif-
ferent types of lenders to investigate the role of shocks to the credit supply. Key to our
identication strategy is the possibility to compare economic outcomes in states with and
without APL, in particular before and after the OCC preemption rule was enacted, but
taking advantage of the substantial heterogenous presence of national banks in di¤erent
counties. Specically, counties with a high fraction of loans originated by national banks in
APL states before 2004 were subject to a positive credit supply shock after the OCC reg-
ulation: national banks were now able to grant loans to riskier borrowers in those counties
with fewer limitations than the other nancial institutions. However, states with APL might
di¤er from states without APL, and counties with a higher presence of national banks might
be subject to di¤erent shocks than counties with a predominant presence of local banks. To
control for these di¤erences, we compare counties within states with APL taking out the
di¤erence between counties with higher OCC lenders and counties with lower OCC lenders
in non-APL states, that is, we employ a triple di¤erences-in-di¤erence estimator to gauge
the e¤ect of credit increase on the real economy. This allows us to sharply identify the e¤ect
of the preemption on the availability of lending to riskier borrowers, and then to use this as
an instrument for the supply of credit during the period preceding the Great Recession.
There are four primary ndings. First, we begin by showing that if we compare counties
in the top versus the bottom decile of presence of national banks in states with anti-predatory
laws the OCC preemption resulted in a 11% increase in annual loan issuance. To control for
di¤erent county characteristics in all specications we include county xed-e¤ects as well as
year xed-e¤ects. We also include a number of di¤erent controls such as the county median
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income and population, as well as the elasticity measure proposed by Saiz (2010) to control for
the increase in the credit demand and in collateral values. This is important because it shows
that our instrument is not capturing di¤erences in the countiespropensity to experience
house price increases, instead, our variation comes from the increase in the supply of credit.
Further, when we restrict attention to subprime counties, dened as the counties with a
higher than the median fraction of subprime borrowers in 2000, we show that the e¤ect of
the preemption on loan origination is about 50% larger. Interestingly, this corroborates our
hypothesis that the preemption regulation signicantly increased the availability of credit
to riskier borrowers. To shed some lights on the time pattern of this e¤ect, we investigate
separately the boom period 2003-2005 and the bust period 2007-2009. We conrm that
counties with stronger presence of OCC lenders experienced a more signicant boom and
bust in loan origination. This estimates constitute our rst stage regression, as we can now
instrument the supply of credit with the interaction between the presence of national banks
in APL states and the post indicator for the period after 2004.
Second, using this as an instrument for the supply of credit, we estimate the e¤ect of
the credit supply on house prices. We nd a large e¤ect. A 10% increase in loan origination
leads to a 3.5% increase in the house price growth rate, which resulted in a total increase of
12% in house prices during the boom period. Moreover, our interaction signicantly predicts
the bust in housing prices as well. Our estimate of the e¤ect of the supply of credit on house
price growth is robust to extensive controls for demographics and income di¤erences across
counties. Moreover, all specications explicitly control for the elasticity of house prices. This
means that absent the preemption regulation, a substantial fraction of the increase in house
prices and the consequent collapse could have been avoided.
Third, we explore the e¤ect of the increase in supply of credit on the employment in non
tradable sectors (as dened by Mian and Su (2012)), in order to focus on the sectors that
are mostly a¤ected by the local demand. We nd that employment rises signicantly more
in counties with a prominent presence of national banks in APL states, even controlling for
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several county characteristics. Specically, our IV estimates suggest that a 10% increase in
loan origination leads to a 2% increase in employment in the non-tradable sectors. Consistent
with our credit-induced uctuation mechanism, we nd that the e¤ect doubles in counties
with a higher fraction of subprime borrowers. Moreover, by restricting attention to the
boom and bust period we nd that the predicted increase in lending are associated with
more pronounced boom and bust.
Finally, we provide evidence on the quality of loans originated by national banks in the
boom period. Interestingly, we nd that counties with a higher fraction of loans originated by
OCC lenders in APL states experienced signicantly lower delinquencies during the boom
period, but at the same time a sharper increase in delinquencies during the bust period.
In other words, if we compare counties in the top versus the bottom decile of presence of
national banks in states with anti-predatory laws, the OCC preemption resulted in a 15%
decrease in delinquencies during the boom period, and in 30% more delinquencies during the
Great Recession. Interestingly, this shows that the increase in lending allowed households to
avoid late payments during the boom years, but aggravated their nancial situation during
the bust, making them more fragile to the downturn. In this case as well we nd that the
results are even stronger when we restrict attention to subprime counties.
To check the robustness of our results and evaluate potential alternative mechanism we
show several additional results. First, one potential concern with our results is that the
presence of national banks might be correlated with the rise in securitization that occurred
during the same period. To rule out this possibility, we compute for each county the fraction
of loans securitized, and use this as a proxy for the banksincentives to increase lending due
to securitization. We show that all of our results are completely una¤ected, which suggests
that our instrument is not correlated with the increase in securitization experienced during
the pre-crisis period. Second, to further control for potential unobserved heterogeneity across
counties, we can restrict attention to the state borders. Since counties in the West coast are
much larger than counties on the East coast, and the sample size of the counties close to the
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state borders is small, we construct our main variables at the census tracts level. We can
conrm our main result even restricting attention to the census tracts within ve miles of the
state borders. Third, we show that our analysis is robust even when we focus it only to states
that eventually passed an anti-predatory law. In other words, if one concern is that states
with APL are fundamentally di¤erent from non-APL states, this test shows that even without
using this variation, but just the di¤erent timing of the adoption, our results hold. Finally,
we also show that the main e¤ects come from an increase in loans to households, while the
lending to small businesses is not signicantly a¤ected by the preemption regulation.1
1.1 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper that is able to estimate the causal e¤ect
of an increase in credit supply on housing prices and real economic activity, showing that an
outward shift in credit supply generates a distinct boom and bust pattern.
There is an emerging literature on the e¤ects of the housing price booms on real economic
activity that is related to this paper, the closest papers to ours are Mian and Su (2009),
and Kermani (2012). First, Mian and Su(2009) show that Zip codes with a higher fraction
of subprime borrowers experienced an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit.
Kermani (2012), instead, provides theory and evidence that links the decline in consumption
and housing wealth in many economic sub regions to the very increase in consumption
and housing wealth in the area, and emphasizes that this cycle results naturally from the
interplay between expanding credit, consumers keen on front-loading their consumption, and
the endogenous relaxation of credit constraints. Our paper makes three signicant advances
relative to these contributions: (1) by exploiting an exogenous variation in the supply of
1We further prove the robustness of our results by showing that the predictive lending increases are not
associated with an increase in employment in the tradable sectors. Furthermore, we can eliminate the states
with the highest delinquency rates and most pronounced housing bubble, Arizona and Nevada, and show
that our results are not driven by those states.
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credit, we are able to estimate the role of the supply of credit on house prices controlling for
local economic shocks; (2) the nature of our data allows us to track not only the e¤ect of
credit on house prices, but also on employment and delinquency rates; and (3) we nd that
the outward shift in the credit supply that followed the preemption regulation signicantly
predict both the boom and the bust in real economic activity.
Other related papers that study the interplay between credit, house prices and consump-
tion include Mian et al. (2011), Mian et al. (2011), Greenstone and Mas (2012), and Adelino
et al. (2012). Mian et al. (2011) exploit the di¤erence between judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure states as an instrument for foreclosures, and show that foreclosures lead to a
signicant decline in house prices and residential investment.2 Mian et al. (2011) show that
Zip codes with more levered households have a higher marginal propensity to consume out
of housing wealth. The importance of the credit channel has recently been highlighted by
Greenstone and Mas (2012), which assesses the role of the supply of credit from banks to
small businesses in a¤ecting the employment decline observed during the Great Recession.
In contrast, we are able to instrument variations in lending with regulatory changes to show
the e¤ect of the increase in lending on the boom and bust experienced in several sectors of
the economy. Finally, Mian and Su (2012) show that job losses in the non-tradable sector
between 2007 and 2009 are signicantly higher in high-leverage counties that experienced
sharp demand declines, while Adelino et al. (2012) exploits changes in the conforming loan
limit as an instrument to gauge the e¤ect of lower cost of nancing on house prices. We
employ the same di¤erentiation of Mian and Su (2012) between tradable and non tradable
sectors to show that the increase in lending, boosted local demand which in turn increased
2Other related papers are Favara and Imbs (2010) and Kleiner and Todd (2007). Favara and Imbs (2010)
employs the the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching E¢ ciency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 to show
that the deregulation triggered an increase in the demand for housing, that is, house prices rose because the
supply of credit increased in deregulating states. In contrast, we identify an increase in credit supply due
to the preemption rule of 2004, and its role in generating a boom and bust cycle on both house prices and
employment. Kleiner and Todd (2007), instead, nd that the requirement in many states that mortgage
brokers maintain a minimum net worth is associated with fewer brokers, fewer subprime mortgages, higher
foreclosure rates, and a greater percentage of high-interest-rate mortgages.
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employment in the non tradable sectors.
This paper also contribute to the growing literature studying the e¤ects of the decline in
lending during the Great Recession. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), for instance, document
that new loans to large borrowers fell by 79% between the second quarter of 2007 and
the fourth quarter of 2008. They argue that it is in large part supply-driven, because
of the decline in banksaccess to short-term debt following the failure of Lehman. Using
Community Reinvestment Act data, Huang and Stephens (2011) and Berrospide and Edge
(2010) show that multi-market banksexposure to markets with housing busts a¤ected the
supply of small business loans within all MSAs. Goetz and Valdez (2010) nd evidence
that di¤erences in liability structure of small U.S. commercial banks, particularly the use of
non-corenancing, a¤ected lending patterns during the 2008 crisis. Dagher and Fu (2011)
shows a positive correlation between the presence of non-bank mortgage originators and the
increased foreclosure ling rates at the onset of the housing downturn.
Finally, Rajan and Ramcharan (2012) examine the farm land price boom (and bust)
in the United States that preceded the Great Depression, and show that credit availability
likely had a direct e¤ect on inating land prices. Moreover, areas with higher ex ante credit
availability su¤ered a greater fall in land prices, and experienced higher bank failure rates.
We show, instead, that the credit supplied by national banks during the expansionary phase
of the business cycle is able to explain the large increase in housing price, employment and
consumption and their subsequent collapse.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background
on the US credit market and its regulation. Section 3 provides details on the data sources.
Section 4 explains the research design and how it is operationalized. Section 5 outlines the
main results and interprets the ndings. Section 6 discusses several robustness checks and
Section 7 concludes.
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2 Regulatory Framework
2.1 Dual banking system
In the United States, residential mortgage lenders are regulated by national and local reg-
ulatory agencies. Specically, national banks, Federal thrifts, and their subsidiaries are
supervised by the OCC or the OTS, respectively. In contrast, state banks and thrifts char-
tered at the state level are supervised by either the Federal Reserve System (FRS), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or by their chartering state. Credit unions,
instead, are supervised by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), while non-
depository independent mortgage companies are regulated by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Trade Commission. One potential concern
is the possibility for banks to switch regulatory agency.
The inconsistencies generated by this dual system have been the subject of a recent
study by Agarwal et al. (2012). The authors show that federal regulators are signicantly
less lenient, downgrading supervisory ratings about twice as frequently as state supervi-
sors. Moreover, under federal regulators, banks report higher nonperforming loans, more
delinquent loans, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower ROA.
Then, banks have the incentive to switch from Federal to state supervision, if allowed to
do so. Rosen (2005) explores the switching in regulatory agencies between 1970 and 2003.
He shows that most of these switches were in the early periods due to new banking policies,
such as the lessening of prohibitions of interstate banking. He nds that the main reason
for switching after the initial period is a merger with a bank chartered at a di¤erent level.
However, he provides evidence that the banks who switch tend to be small banks with total
assets less than one billion. These ndings corroborates the validity of our identication
strategy. However, the granularity of our data set allow us to track the banks that changed
regulatory agencies in our sample, which gives us the opportunity to address any further
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concerns related to this issue.
2.2 Anti-predatory laws
This dual banking system generated conicting regulations when several states passed anti-
predatory laws and the OCC issued a preemption rule for national banks. In 1994, Congress
passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) which imposed substantive
restrictions on lending terms and practices for mortgages with high prices, based on either the
APR or the total points and fees imposed. This regulation aimed to address abusive practices
in renances and home equity loans with high interest rates or high fees.3 However, very
high thresholds used to classify mortgages as predatory or high cost;signicantly reduced
the applicability of these restrictions, in fact, these high cost mortgagesonly accounted
for one percent of subprime residential mortgages, targeting the most abusive sector of the
subprime mortgage market (Bostic et al. (2008)).
In subsequent years, many states adopted stronger anti-predatory lending regulations
than federal law requires. Anti-predatory laws try to address di¤erent forms of unfair and
deceptive practices such as lenders steering borrowers into a higher interest rate loan than
they could qualify for, making a loan without considering the borrowers repayment ability,
charging borrower exorbitant fees, or adding abusive subprime prepayment penalties, all
of which might signicantly increase the risk of foreclosure. The rst comprehensive state
law was passed in 1999 by North Carolina, and it aimed at preventing predatory mortgage
lending in the subprime mortgage market. As of January 2007, 29 states and the District of
Columbia had anti-predatory laws in e¤ect.
The anti-predatory laws can potentially have di¤erent e¤ects on the mortgage market
outcomes. On the one hand, the laws might ration credit and increase the price of subprime
3Agarwal and Evano¤ (2013), for instance, provide evidence of unscrupulous lender behavior  e.g.,
predatory lending  during the housing boom of the 2000s. They show that lenders steered higher-quality
borrowers to a¢ liates that provided subprime-like loans, with borrowers being charged 40-60 bps higher
APR.
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loans. On the other hand, the regulation might be essential to allay consumer fears about
dishonest lenders and ensure that creditors internalize the cost of any negative externalities
from predatory loans, which might boost the demand for credit.
There is a strong body of evidence that has recently shown that anti-predatory laws
had an important role in the subprime market. Ding et al. (2012), for instance, nds that
anti-predatory laws are associated with a 43% reduction in prepayment penalties, and a 40%
decrease in adjustable-rate mortgages. Moreover, they nd that anti-predatory laws are also
correlated with a signicant reduction in the riskier borrowerslikelihood to default. These
e¤ects are even stronger for subprime regions, i.e. the ones with higher fraction of borrowers
with FICO scores below 620.
Using 2004 HMDA data, Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) nd that subprime loans
originated in states with APLs had lower APRs than loans in unregulated states. Further
evidence is provided by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2008). They focus on border counties of
adjacent states with and without anti-predatory laws to control for labor and housing markets
characteristics, and using a legal index, they examine the e¤ect of APLs on the probability
of subprime applications, originations, and rejections. They nd that stronger regulatory
restrictions reduced the likelihood of origination and application. Similarly, Elliehausen
et al. (2006) using a proprietary database of subprime loans originated by eight large lenders
from 1999 to 2004, nd that the presence of a law was associated with a decrease in total
subprime originations. More recently, Agarwal et al. (2013) estimate the e¤ect of an anti-
predatory pilot policy in Chicago on mortgage default rates, which required low-credit-
quality applicants and applicants for riskymortgages to submit their loan o¤ers from
state-licensed lenders for third-party review by HUD-certied nancial counselors. They
show that this policy signicantly a¤ected both the origination rates of risky mortgages and
their characteristics.4
Finally, the anti-predatory laws had likely an important e¤ect on lenderssecuritization
4For a theoretical model of predatory lending see Bond et al. (2009).
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incentives. In fact, the credit rating agencies clearly stated that after the APLs were enacted,
they started requiring credit enhancement from lenders that could be in violation of state
predatory laws: "To the extent that potential violations of APLs reduce the funds available
to repay RMBS investors, the likelihood of such violations and the probable severity of the
penalties must be included in Moodys overall assessment".5
We are going to follow this literature in considering only the states that passed anti-
predatory laws pertaining purchase loans, and that were not just mini HOEPA implemented
to prevent local regulation. Appendix A shows the states that passed an anti-predatory law
and their implementation date.
2.3 Preemption Rule
On January 7, 2004 the OCC adopted sweeping regulations preempting a broad range of
state laws attempting to regulate the terms of credit from applying to national banks
activities. The OCC determined that the preemption pertains to those laws that regulate
loan terms, lending and deposit relationships and require a state license to lend. The nal rule
also provided for preemption when the law would obstruct, impair, or condition a national
banks exercise of its lending, deposit-taking, or other powers granted to it under federal law,
either directly or through operating subsidiaries. The new regulations e¤ectively barred the
application of all state laws to national banks, except where (i) Congress has expressly
incorporated state-law standards in federal statutes or (ii) particular state laws have only an
incidentale¤ect on national banks. The OCC has said that state laws will be deemed to
have a permissible, incidentale¤ect only if such laws (i) are part of the legal infrastructure
that makes it practicablefor national banks to conduct their federally-authorized activities
and (ii) do not regulate the manner or content of the business of banking authorized for
national banks,such as contracts, torts, criminal law, the right to collect debts, acquisition
5Available at https://www.moodys.com.
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and transfer of property, taxation, and zoning.
Specically, the OCC preempted all regulations pertaining the following:
 Loan-to-value ratios;
 The terms of credit, including schedule for repayment of principal and interest, amorti-
zation of loans, balance, payments due, minimum payments, or term to maturity of the
loan, including the circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable
upon the passage of time or a specied event external to the loan;
 The aggregate amount of funds that may be loans upon the security of real property;
 Security property, including leaseholds;
 Access to, and use of, credit reports;
 Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specic statements, information,
or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing
statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents;
 Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation
in, mortgages;
 Rates of interest on mortgage loans;
This means that starting in 2004 the subprime mortgage market in states with anti-
predatory laws was an unleveled playing eld, as national banks were the only mortgage
institutions able to provide credit to riskier borrowers without limitations on the terms of
credit.
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
We collect data on the ow of new mortgage loans originated every year from 1999 to 2011
through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act(HMDA) data set at the loan application level.
It records each applicants nal status (denied/approved/originated), purpose of borrowing
(home purchase/renancing/home improvement), loan amount, race, sex, income, and home
ownership status. We aggregate HMDA data up to the county level and computed the
fraction of loans originated by lenders regulated by the OCC. We augment this data set
by obtaining information on the fraction of securitized loans by counties from Blackbox
Logic. BlackBox is a private company that provides a comprehensive, dynamic dataset
with information about twenty-one million privately securitized Subprime, Alt-A, and Prime
loans originated after 1999. These loans account for about 90% of all privately securitized
mortgages from that period.
Our countylevel house price data from 1999 to 2011 come from Zillow.com which com-
bines the underlying transactions data with a hedonic adjustment model that assigns values
to homes based on characteristics of the home, specically, it is a function of the size of the
home, the number of bedrooms, and the number of bathrooms. To control for heterogene-
ity in the county propensity to experience housing bubbles we use the elasticity measure
proposed by Saiz (2010) and largely adopted by the existing literature. To further comple-
ment our data about the nancial conditions of the di¤erent counties, we employ The New
York Fed Consumer Credit Panel which provides county level information on loan amounts,
mortgage delinquency rates and the fraction of households with FICO scores below 620.
To study how the credit expansion a¤ected employment, we extracted the employment
data from the County Business Pattern, which allows us to di¤erentiate between tradable
and non tradable sectors (following the classication of Mian and Su (2012)). Finally, in
order to control in our estimations for the local demand for credit, we also add countylevel
data on demographics, income, and business statistics through the Census.
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4 Research Design
This papers research design is based on the observation that the preemption regulation
have signicantly a¤ected the availability of credit to subprime borrowers, especially in
counties where the presence of national banks was already predominant. Our identication
strategy exploits the heterogeneity in countiesexposure to national banks, under the testable
assumption that riskier households can only incompletely substitute for the reduction in the
supply of credit from their state-chartered bank a¤ected by the APL. In other words, we
believe that it is plausible that a lending supply shock to a subset of banks in a region can
a¤ect aggregate lending in that area since households cannot easily substitute across banks
in di¤erent regions. This hypothesis will be tested directly in the rst stage of estimation.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the fraction of loans originated by OCC lenders across
the U.S. counties. It shows that indeed the importance of national banks in the mortgage
market varies signicantly across counties. This source of heterogeneity is critical to study
how a change in the regulation a¤ects the availability of credit in the di¤erent counties.
Specically, our estimation methodology is a triple di¤erence estimator (DDD). The
reason why we are employing this empirical methodology is twofold. First, the potential
problem with just using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DD) between counties with a higher
fraction of OCC lenders relative to counties with a smaller fraction of OCC lenders might be
contaminated by changes in the local mortgage market conditions, which might endogenously
drive the presence of national banks. Second, a di¤erent DD analysis would be to use another
state as the control group and use the counties with a higher fraction of OCC lenders from
the non-APL state as the control group. However, this approach is problematic as well, as
changes in the availability of credit in counties with a high fraction of national banks might
be systematically di¤erent across states due to, say, income and wealth di¤erences, rather
than the preemption policy. Moreover, states that decided to enact an APL might have done
that in response to the conditions of the local credit market.
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A more robust analysis than either of the DD analyses described above can be obtained
by using both a di¤erent state and a control group within the APL state. Specically, we
run the following regression
Log(Loan Amount)i;t = i + t + 1APLg;t  Post2004 + 2OCC2003  Post2004 (1)
+3OCC2003  APLg;t + 4APLg;t  Post2004 OCC2003 +Xi;t + "i;t;
where i denotes the county, g the state, and t the year of origination of the loan. We measure
the county i0s exposure to the preemption regulation with the fraction of loans originated
by OCC lenders in 2003. Post2004 is a dummy variable equal to 1 after 2004, when the
preemption rule was enacted, whereas APLg;t is equal to 1 if the state has enacted an anti-
predatory law in state g at time t. Xi;t is a vector of controls at the county level such as
population, income, and the elasticity of house prices. The coe¢ cient of interest is 4, the
coe¢ cient on the triple interaction.
The DDD estimate starts with the time change in averages for the counties with higher
fraction of national banks in the APL state and then nets out the change in means for
counties with a high fraction of OCC lenders in the non-APL state and the change in means
for the counties with a low fraction of OCC lenders in the APL state. The objective is that
this controls for two kinds of potentially confounding trends: ex ante di¤erential incentives
of lenders to supply credit in counties with high fraction of OCC lenders across states (that
would have nothing to do with the preemption policy) and changes in the mortgage market
of all counties in the APL state (possibly due to other state policies that a¤ect everyones
propensity to lend, or state-specic changes in the economy that a¤ect lenderssoundness).
We start our analysis by showing that the fraction of national banks is very persistent
over time. Figure 2 shows the relation between the fraction of OCC lenders at time t and
at t   2 for both states with and without anti-predatory laws. It shows that in both cases
the correlation over time is above .9. This evidence reassures us that using the measure of
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national banks as of 2003 is a strong predictor for their presence in the subsequent years,
moreover, it also shows that the introduction of the 2004 preemption rule did not signicantly
a¤ected the composition of the lenders, e.g. national banks did not suddenly increase their
presence in states with APL after the OCC regulation.
Table 1 provides the summery statistics for our main variables and for the four di¤erent
regions: counties with below and above the median presence of national banks, for states
with and without anti-predatory laws. First thing to notice is that both for the level and
the change in the elasticity of housing supply, population and median income there are no
signicant di¤erences across the four regions. We then investigate for our main dependent
variables, loan amounts, house prices and employment, the change from 2003 to 2005 and
from 2008 to 2010. We nd that there is a signicant di¤erence between our treatment and
control group, which conrms our hypothesis that the preemption regulation di¤erentially
a¤ected counties with a high compared with a low presence of OCC lenders in APL versus
non-APL states. We then check for the existence of these di¤erences in the pre-period, from
2001 up to 2003, and we nd that there are none. This shows that there are no pre-trends,
so our empirical strategy is valid.
We can now start presenting our estimation results. Table 2 reports the result of regress-
ing the mortgages originated in di¤erent counties for purchase a house on the interaction
between APLg;t, the Post indicator and an indicator OCC which is equal to one if the orig-
inator of the loan is regulated by the OCC, and is then exempt from complying with the
anti-predatory laws, and zero otherwise. Column 1 looks at the level and show that there
is a signicant increase in loan originated by national banks in APL states after 2004. In
columns 2 and 3 we investigate the e¤ects on the lending growth controlling for county xed
e¤ects, and county times agency xed e¤ects respectively. In both specications, we nd
that national banks located in states with APL increased their lending signicantly. These
results suggest that lenders regulated by the OCC signicantly increased their lending after
the preemption regulation in states with anti-predatory laws.
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Table 3, instead, shows the results of (1) estimated on di¤erent subsamples. In column
(1) we restrict attention to the boom period 2003-2005 and run a cross-sectional regression
with the log of the change in loan origination between 2003 and 2005 being our dependent
variable. We control for the change in median income and population over the same period
and for the elasticity of house prices. We nd that our coe¢ cient of interest is positive and
both statistically and economically signicant. This means that counties in APL states with
a higher fraction of national banks have experienced a larger expansion of credit than other
counties. Columns (2)-(4) estimate, instead, the same regression but on the yearly changes
of loan amounts, controlling in turn for year and county xed-e¤ects, log of the median
income and population, and for the elasticity of housing prices and its interaction with the
Post indicator. We consistently nd that the presence of national banks in APL states is
associated with larger increases in loan origination.
Since the preemption regulation a¤ects mainly the subprime market, in column (5) we
restrict attention to the counties with FICO scores below 620 in 2000 above the median of
24%. Consistently with the hypothesis that after the preemption rule the national banks had
the opportunity to signicantly expand their supply of credit to riskier borrowers, we nd
that the coe¢ cient is about 50% larger than when we consider the whole sample of counties.
Finally, in column (6) we examine the bust period, 2007 through 2010, where the dependent
variable is the change in loan origination in that period, and nd that the same counties that
increased lending during the expansionary phase of the business cycle are the ones where
lending is cut the most during the bust period. We nd that if we compare counties in the
top versus the bottom decile of presence of national banks in states with anti-predatory laws
the OCC preemption resulted in a 11% increase in annual loan issuance.
This results show that the preemption rule had a signicant e¤ect on the credit supply of
national banks in APL states. To further check that the di¤erential e¤ects of the expansion
of credit across counties are not driven by di¤erential trends among the counties, Figure 3
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depicts the time-series coe¢ cients of the following regressions:
Log(Loan Amount)i;t =
X
 6=t0
APLg;t  Post2004 OCC20031(=t) + t + i +  i;t + "g;t;
where 1(=t) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for year t; and  i;t contains all the other main
e¤ects. We have normalized the coe¢ cient 2004 corresponding to the preemption rule to
zero. This event study shows that in the pre-period there was no di¤erence in credit supply
among counties with di¤erent fraction of OCC lenders that might explain our results. In
other words, the treatment group (counties with a higher fraction of OCC lenders) and
control group (lower fraction) were on parallel trends in the pre-period.
5 Main Results
In this section we present the main results of the paper by looking at the e¤ect of the predicted
change in the supply of credit on house prices, employment, and delinquency rates.
5.1 The E¤ect of Credit Expansion on House Prices
To precisely estimate the e¤ect of the credit expansion on house prices, controlling for dif-
ferent characteristics of the counties, we present in Table 4 the results from the following
reduced form
House Prices Growthi;t = i + t + 1APLg;t  Post2004 + 2OCC2003  Post2004 (2)
+3OCC2003  APLg;t + 4APLg;t  Post2004 OCC2003 +Xi;t + "i;t;
with 4 being our coe¢ cient of interest. In columns (1)-(3) we start controlling for year
and county xed-e¤ects and then add the change in median income and population and the
elasticity measure times Post as additional controls. In all three specications the coe¢ cient
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is positive and signicant. This shows that predicted increase in credit supply are indeed
associated with an increase in house prices. As in the existing literature, we also nd that in
counties with more elastic supply of houses we nd that the house prices increases less than
in other counties. House prices growth is also negatively correlated with the introduction of
the APL, as this would reduce the amount of lending to subprime borrowers, while changes
in income and population are positively associated with house price growth.
Interestingly, we conrm in column (4) that the e¤ect on house prices is even larger for
counties with a larger fraction of subprime borrowers. This corroborates the hypothesis that
a large fraction of the house appreciation is due to the increase in credit available to riskier
borrowers, who would not have had the possibility to purchase a house otherwise.
Since we are ultimately interested in how a change in the credit supply a¤ects the house
growth, we can explicitly instrument the credit supply with our main interaction, moreover,
we have already shown that our instrument is uncorrelated with other county characteristics.
In column (5) we estimate the e¤ect of an increase in loan amounts using two stage least
squares as follows:
House Growthi;t = \Loan Amounti;t + i + t +Xi;t + "i;t
where the predicted increase in loan amount \Loan Amount is estimates using the rst
stage regression 1. We nd that the e¤ect is insignicantly larger, as the coe¢ cient increase
by about 40 percent. This IV estimation allows us to argue that a 10 percent increase in
the credit supply results in 3.5 percent increase in house prices growth over the 2003-2006
period. This leads to a total increase of house prices by 12%.
As an additional check we assessed the issue of possible weakness of our instrumental
variable. We generally observe F statistics above Stock (2008) weak identication critical
value of ten, rejecting the hypothesis that the IV is weak. We also veried that all our
results were robust to weak instruments by employing the approach in Moreira (2009), which
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produces tests and condence sets with correct size when instruments are arbitrarily weak
for the just-identied case of a single endogenous variable.
5.2 The E¤ect of Credit on Employment
In this section, we estimate the e¤ect of the outward shift of the credit supply on aggregate
employment. We should expect that job losses in the non-tradable sector will be more
correlated with the local demand and with the household indebtedness, than job losses in
the tradable sector. The underlying mechanism that we aim to identify is the following: an
increase in the availability of credit will boost the local demand and consumption, which in
turn will raise employment.
Table 5 shows the main results on employment in the non-tradable sector. In column
(1) we investigate the change in employment during the boom years 2003-2005. We nd
that counties with a higher fraction of national banks experienced a greater increase in
employment during those years. We then look in column (2) at the e¤ect on employment
controlling for year and county xed-e¤ects, and the coe¢ cient is still positive and signicant.
We check the robustness of our results by controlling for various county characteristics in
columns (2)-(4). The coe¢ cient remains positive and both statistically and economically
signicant.
In column (5) we restrict attention to subprime counties and nd that the coe¢ cient dou-
bles in magnitude. This result suggests that a 10% increase in annual loan issuance induces
a 3% increase in employment in counties with riskier borrowers. In column (6) we instru-
ment the increase in credit supply and nd that the coe¢ cient is 35% larger than the OLS
estimates. The instrumental variables estimate implies that a ten percent increase in loan
issuance is associated with a 2% increase in employment in the non-tradable sector. These
results together show that the credit boom experienced during the early 2000s can account
for a large fraction of the increase in employment pre-crisis, but also for their subsequent
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collapse.
5.3 The E¤ect of Credit on Delinquency Rates
In the previous sections we have documented that counties that are more exposed to the
preemption regulation, because of a higher fraction of national banks, experienced larger
boom and bust in house prices and employment. In this section we provide evidence that
one of the mechanism that contributed towards aggravating the uctuations in the counties
with a higher fraction of national banks is the increased fragility of borrowers that increased
their leverage during the boom period, and in turn their propensity to default at the onset
of the downturn.
We formally test this hypothesis in Table 6. In column (1) we show the results for the
cross section of counties, and nd that the delinquency rates were signicantly lower during
the 2003-2006 period in counties with a higher fraction of national banks in APL states, even
controlling for changes in population and income. In column (2)-(4) we estimate a similar
reduced form controlling for various characteristics of the county. As expected, we nd that
income is negatively correlated with delinquency rates, similarly more elastic counties are
the ones with lower default rates. The main coe¢ cient of interest is positive and signicant
in all the specications. The e¤ect is also economically large as a 10% increase in annual
loan issuance predicts a reduction of 10% in defaults.
Finally, column (6) analyze the period 2007-2010 and shows that predicted increases in
lending are associated with a signicant increase in delinquency rates. This suggests that
all the debt accumulated during the boom made the households more vulnerable to defaults
in the recession. The e¤ect is even more signicant than for the boom period, as if we
compare counties in the top versus the bottom decile of presence of national banks in states
with anti-predatory laws the OCC preemption resulted in a 30% increase in delinquencies.
This is consistent with the idea that riskier borrowers were able to maintain their level of
21
indebtedness without defaulting thanks to the amount of credit available during the booms,
but were adversely a¤ected in the subsequent years, which led them to default with higher
frequency.
One potential explanation for the increase in loan issuance shown in Table 3 is that
national banks were more able to identify the higher quality borrowers than the other lenders,
such as independent mortgage lenders or local banks. However, if this was true than we
should have expected to nd that the households who borrowed from national banks were
less and not more likely to default at the onset of the crisis, but Table 6 rules out this
possibility.
6 Robustness
In this section, we further test the validity of our identication strategy and examine several
alternative hypothesis which could potentially explain our results.
6.1 Securitization
One potential concern with the results presented in the previous sections is that the presence
of national banks might be correlated with the rise in securitization that occurred during the
same period. Alternatively, given the credit rating concernsabout potential violation of the
state anti-predatory laws, the inaction of the OCC preemption rule might have also increase
the national banks possibility to securitize loans, even if independent mortgage lenders
rather than national banks are usually recognized as the key players in the securitization
market. In other words, we try address the following question: can our result be explained
by the rise in the securitization rather than by an outward shift in the credit supply?
To control for such concern, we collected data from BlackBox Logic which is the largest
provider of data on securitized loans. The database covers 90 percent of the entire universe
of securitized loans, and we aggregated this data at the county level. This gives us a reliable
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measure of securitized loans that varies at the county level.
Table 7 presents the main estimation of the paper (1), but adds as an additional control
this measure of securitization. We nd that all of our results are robust to such inclusion:
both the magnitude and the statistical signicance is unchanged. This suggests that our
instrument is not picking up variation in the mortgage originatorsincentives to securitize
loans. Our instrument is then capturing a di¤erent source of variation that works through
the national bankslending incentives, which contributed to the credit boom experienced in
the 2003-2006 period.
6.2 Evidence from States borders
We have controlled for a number of county characteristics, however, in order to control for
potential unobserved heterogeneity across counties which could potentially bias our results,
we can restrict attention to the state borders. Since counties in the West coast are much
larger than counties on the East coast, and the sample size of the counties close to the state
borders is small, we construct our main variables at the census tracts level. This allow us
to have a very homogeneous sample as census tracts are very similar in terms of size across
the whole U.S. and a much larger sample size.
We consider only census tracts pairs in di¤erent states whose minimum distance is about
10 miles. We have a sample of 4600 census tracts for the results on loan amounts, while we
have house price data for only 540 census tracts close to state borders. The reason why we
do not have more data on house prices for more census tracts is because many census tracts
at the border are rural area, whose house prices indexes are not available. In order to run
our triple-di¤erence estimator we compute the fraction of loans originated by national banks
in 2003 in each census tract.
Table 8 shows the results of the same regression as in 1 but by including border times
time xed e¤ects and census tracts xed e¤ects. This allows us to control for any trend
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specic to the border and for unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity across census
tracts. Interestingly, we nd that our main interaction coe¢ cient is still highly signicant
and its magnitude is just slightly lower than the one in Table 3. This further validates our
triple di¤erence estimator, because in principle if the assumptions underlying it are valid,
the magnitude should not depend upon the sample we consider.
6.3 Focusing on States with APL
Since the implementation of anti-predatory laws is not random, one of our main concerns
is to control for heterogeneity between states that decided to enact such a law, and the
ones that did not. Our triple-di¤erence methodology is partly motivated by such a concern,
moreover, the previous results show that even when we restrict attention to the state-borders
we nd similar e¤ects. However, we can run an additional robustness check: we can focus
our analysis to states that eventually passed an anti-predatory law. In other words, our
treatment group includes the states that passed an anti-predatory law between 2000 and
2004, and the control group is the set of states that implemented these regulations in the
subsequent years.
If the main concern is that states with APL are fundamentally di¤erent from non-APL
states, this test should show that even without using this variation, but just the di¤erent
timing of the adoption, our results hold. Obviously, we are not saying that the timing is
exogenous, but we do believe that this additional test might still be useful in showing that
the variation we are employing is not coming from heterogeneity across states, but from the
preemption rule and its e¤ects on the national bankscredit supply.
Table 9 shows the results for the four dependent variables of interest. In all specications,
we control for time and county xed e¤ects. Column 1 shows that the e¤ect on loan amounts
is both economically and statistically signicant. Column 2 analyze the impact of our main
interaction variable on house prices, and it shows that counties with a higher fraction of
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national banks experience a larger house prices increase compared to counties with a lower
fraction of national banks, within states that passed at some point an anti-predatory law.
Column 3 investigates a similar specication for the employment in the non-tradable sector.
The sign and the magnitude are very similar to the main specications, but the coe¢ cient
is not signicant. Finally, column 4 analyzes the pattern of delinquency rates, and it shows
that very similar results to our main specication hold for this restricted sample.
6.4 Other Banking Activities
The preemption regulation changed the competition landscape of the mortgage market, as
national banks by having an advantage in the subprime segment could have employed the
additional prots and invest it locally. This in turn could have signicantly a¤ected the
local economy through di¤erent channels than the credit supply to households one. For
instance, one possibility is that the national banks could have started increase their lending
to small businesses with the proceeds of the loans to riskier borrowers during the boom.
The relaxation of the credit constraints for the local businesses could explain the increase in
employment and potentially in house prices.
To evaluate this possibility, we have collected information about national bankslending
to small businesses using the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) disclosure data from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). The CRA requires banks with
assets above the $1 billion threshold to report small business lending each year. Greenstone
and Mas (2012) estimate that in 2007 CRA eligible banks accounted for approximately
86% of all loans under $1 million. FFIEC provides data by bank, county, and year. We
aggregated the data by type of lender to compute the total amount lent by national banks
to small businesses during our sample period.
Table 10 shows our main regression (1). Column (1) analyze the e¤ect of CRA lending
on the loan issuance, while Columns (2)-(4) are devoted to the house price growth, the
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employment in the non tradable sector and on the delinquency rate. We nd that CRA
lending does not impact neither the signicance nor the magnitude of our coe¢ cient of
interest, namely the interaction between APL, the Post indicator and the fraction of loans
to households by OCC lenders in 2003. This evidence helps out in disentangling the direct
credit supply e¤ect from the indirect spillover that might have contributed to the county
growth. Moreover, these results are in line with Figure 2, as they suggest that the preemption
regulation did not signicantly a¤ected the mortgage market in other dimension other than
the lending to riskier households.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have exploited important changes in banking regulation which had di¤er-
ential e¤ects on states that enacted anti-predatory laws versus the ones without such laws,
and on counties with a di¤erent presence of national banks. This provides us with a novel
identication strategy that allows us to investigate the role of the supply of credit on the
boom and bust in house prices and real economic activity experienced by the U.S.
We uncover four main ndings. First, counties that are more a¤ected by the new regu-
lation, that is, the one with stronger presence of national banks in APL states, are the ones
where there is a signicantly higher origination of loans, an increase of 11% per year. Second,
house prices rise signicantly more in these same counties, but they also experience a more
signicant drop during the bust periods. Third, we provide evidence that this increase in
the supply of credit had a signicant e¤ect on the real economic activity, as employment in
the non-tradable sector increases are associated with the predicted increases in lending to
riskier borrowers. Forth, we also provide evidence that such a credit boom led to an increase
in delinquency rates at the onset of the housing downturn.
These results shed novel lights on the e¤ect of a credit boom on the real economy, how it
spreads across the U.S. during the 2002-2006 period, and show that an outward shift in the
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supply of credit to riskier households may lead to an exacerbation of economic uctuations.
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Diff-in-Diff
Below 
Median
Above 
Median
Below 
Median
Above 
Median
Fraction of OCC lenders in 2003 0.219 0.349 0.230 0.345 -0.015
Elasticity of housing supply -1.568 -2.083 -1.575 -1.775 0.315
Log Population in 2003 10.58 10.66 10.70 10.73 -0.05
Log Median Income in 2003 12.51 12.09 13.26 12.60 -0.24
Median Income 0.0727 0.0549 0.103 0.0835 -0.0017
Population 0.0306 0.0220 0.0212 0.0171 0.0045
Fraction of Loans Securitized 0.204 0.162 0.238 0.194 -0.002
Loan amounts 0.710 0.443 0.455 0.428 0.24 ***
House prices 0.450 0.250 0.359 0.289 0.13 *
Employment in non-tradables 0.0725 0.0471 0.0508 0.0441 0.0187 *
Median Income -0.00495 -0.0108 -0.00595 -0.00928 0.00252
Population 0.00583 0.00728 0.00583 0.00724 -4E-05
Loan amounts -0.265 -0.202 -0.179 -0.210 -0.094 ***
House prices -0.170 -0.0744 -0.112 -0.0929 -0.0765 **
Employment in non-tradables -0.0567 -0.0409 -0.0403 -0.0481 -0.0236 **
Median Income 0.0302 0.0257 0.0146 0.00803 -0.00207
Population 0.00803 0.0102 0.0178 0.0150 -0.00497
Loan amounts 0.379 0.280 0.372 0.286 0.013
House prices 0.207 0.154 0.275 0.150 -0.072
Employment in non-tradables 0.0450 0.0196 0.0454 0.0138 -0.0062
Change from 
2003-2005
Change from 
2008-2010
Change from 
2001-2003 (Pre-
trends)
Table 1
Summary Statistics
The table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables employed in our analysis. Loan Amount is computed using HDMA 
data, and denotes the value of mortgages to purchase a home by mortgage lenders in the period 2000-2011. Data on 
Population and Income are from the Census. House prices are from Zillow.com and are aggregated at the county level. The 
Fraction of OCC lenders in 2003 is the share of loans originated by all the mortgage lenders regulated by The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) as of 2003, and is computed using data from HDMA. We compute the averages for these 
variables for counties with above and below the median fraction of loans originated by OCC lenders, and for both states with 
and without anti-predatory laws. the Column Diff-in-Diff is our baseline estimator and tests for significant differences between 
the treatment and the control group. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).     
States without         
Anti-Predatory Law
States with         
Anti-Predatory Law
1 2 3
Log of loan amount
APL x Post x OCC 0.09*** 0.55*** 0.54***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.10)
APL -0.01 -0.10
(0.02) (0.07)
APL x OCC -0.01 -0.11** -0.10*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
APL x Post -0.10*** -0.33***
(0.02) (0.09)
OCC -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02)
Post 0.42*** 1.21***
(0.02) (0.08)
OCC x Post -0.07*** -0.63*** -0.63***
(0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 11.52*** 1.81*** 1.94***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes
County-Agency Fixed Effects Yes
County-Year Fixed Effetcs Yes
Observations 90,957 89,170 89,170
R-squared 0.98 0.16 0.14
Loan Amounts / Loan Amounts in 2000
Table 2
Preemption of National Banks and the Amount of Loans Issued Under Each Regulatory Agency
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the amount of newly 
originated loans under each regulatory agency to the preemtion of national banks were weights equal to 
population of county. Loan amounts is based on HMDA and is the amount of loans originated for 
purchainsg a house aggregated for each regulatory agency at county level for each year.  "APL" is equal to 
one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years 
after 2004. "OCC" is equal to one if the regulating agency is OCC. The results reported in columns 1 to 3 
are for years 2000 to 2006.  Robust standard errors, clustered at county level, are below the coefficients in 
paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
1 2 3 4 5 6
Subprime 
counties
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 1.468*** 0.568*** 0.513*** 0.864*** 1.197*** -0.376*
(0.367) (0.150) (0.123) (0.225) (0.305) (0.218)
APL -0.600*** 0.0418 0.0267 0.0339 0.135* 0.152**
(0.122) (0.0350) (0.0364) (0.0561) (0.0705) (0.0729)
APL X Post -0.214*** -0.212*** -0.304*** -0.378***
(0.0520) (0.0425) (0.0692) (0.0920)
APL X Fraction OCC -0.210** -0.127 -0.175 -0.530**
(0.0971) (0.101) (0.175) (0.241)
Post X Fraction OCC -0.667*** -0.479*** -0.630*** -0.614***
(0.117) (0.0924) (0.168) (0.230)
Fraction OCC -1.052*** 0.499***
(0.276) (0.143)
Elasticity -0.0517*** -0.0225**
(0.0119) (0.0112)
Elasticity X Post -0.0435*** -0.0686***
(0.00850) (0.0111)
Log(Median Income) 1.540*** 1.514*** 1.380***
(0.144) (0.171) (0.241)
Log(Population) 1.208*** 1.281*** 1.320***
(0.155) (0.175) (0.222)
Change in Median Income 2.104***
(0.271)
Change in Population 3.158***
(0.481)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 770 15,533 15,533 5,390 2,758 770
R-squared 0.371 0.027 0.151 0.214 0.276 0.079
Number of counties 770 2,219 2,219 770 394 770
Table 3
Preemption of National Banks and Boom-Bust in Loan Origination
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the amount of newly originated purchase loans to the preemtion of national banks with weights equal to the population of 
each county. Loan amounts is based on HMDA and is the amount of loans originated for purchainsg a house aggregated at county level for each year.  "APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-
predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of OCC lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is a measure of elasticity of housing supply provided 
by Saiz (2010).  The results in columns 2 to 5 are for years 2000 to 2006. Subprime counties are defined as counties with the fraction of subprime borrowers above the median.  Robust standard errors , 
clustered at county level for columns 2 to 5, are below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
Change in Loan Amount  in 2003-2005
Log of Loan amount
Full Sample
Change in Loan Amount  in 2008-
2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Subprime 
counties
IV estimate
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 0.814** 0.357*** 0.330*** 0.330** 0.467** -0.504**
(0.370) (0.108) (0.106) (0.140) (0.188) (0.210)
Instrumented Log of Loan 
Amounts 0.364***
(0.139)
APL -0.336*** 0.0177 0.0249 0.0241 0.0710 0.0104 0.170**
(0.115) (0.0352) (0.0361) (0.0489) (0.0435) (0.0318) (0.0680)
APL X Post -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.114** -0.170*** 0.00250
(0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0496) (0.0575) (0.0232)
APL X Fraction OCC -0.117 -0.133 -0.145 -0.185 -0.0897
(0.102) (0.106) (0.141) (0.138) (0.0878)
Post X Fraction OCC -0.208*** -0.174*** -0.147 -0.262* 0.186
(0.0623) (0.0605) (0.0905) (0.146) (0.119)
Fraction OCC -0.472 0.517***
(0.290) (0.186)
Elasticity -0.0547*** 0.0271***
(0.0172) (0.00666)
Elasticity X Post -0.0108* -0.0170*** 0.0103
(0.00634) (0.00543) (0.0136)
Log(Median Income) 0.310* 0.340* -0.0133
(0.166) (0.185) (0.152)
Log(Population) 0.493*** 0.541*** 0.670***
(0.117) (0.132) (0.177)
Change in Median Income 2.795*** -0.169
(0.736) (0.235)
Change in Population 1.643*** 0.484
(0.324) (0.449)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 459 4,057 4,057 2,754 1,261 2,754 478
R-squared 0.476 0.023 0.042 0.046 0.077 -0.045 0.155
Number of counties 459 693 693 472 216 472 478
Table 4
Preemption of National Banks and Boom-Bust in House Prices
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating house prices to the preemtion of national banks and the increase in the supply of 
loans induced by the preemption where the weights are given by the population of each county. House prices are from Zillow.com. "APL" is equal to one if the state has 
passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of OCC lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is 
a measure of elasticity of housing supply provided by Saiz (2010).  The results in columns 2 to 6 are for years 2000 to 2006. In column 6, "APL X Post X Fraction OCC" 
is used as an instrument for the log of loan amounts.  Subprime counties are defined as counties with the fraction of subprime borrowers above the median. Robust 
standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 2 to 5, are below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
Change in House Prices  
in 2003-2005
Change in House 
Prices  in 2008-2010
Full Sample
House Prices Growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Subprime 
counties
IV estimate
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 0.207** 0.216*** 0.165*** 0.169** 0.326*** -0.205**
(0.0817) (0.0734) (0.0610) (0.0750) (0.109) (0.0966)
Instrumented Log of Loan Amounts 0.198**
(0.0782)
APL -0.0718*** 0.0523*** 0.0330** 0.0231 0.0281 0.0155 0.0616**
(0.0242) (0.0175) (0.0163) (0.0196) (0.0275) (0.0161) (0.0308)
APL X Post -0.0731*** -0.0619*** -0.0667*** -0.114*** -0.00692
(0.0234) (0.0186) (0.0223) (0.0302) (0.00652)
APL X Fraction OCC -0.169*** -0.0902* -0.0590 -0.0956 -0.0243
(0.0545) (0.0493) (0.0613) (0.0888) (0.0548)
Post X Fraction OCC -0.201*** -0.108** -0.0830 -0.201** 0.0440
(0.0594) (0.0463) (0.0598) (0.0813) (0.0422)
Fraction OCC -0.0991 0.0342
(0.0644) (0.0554)
Elasticity -0.00207 0.00739***
(0.00284) (0.00268)
Elasticity X Post -0.00495* -0.00668 0.00286
(0.00274) (0.00458) (0.00406)
Log(Median Income) 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.259*** -0.0108
(0.0422) (0.0443) (0.0724) (0.123)
Log(Population) 0.893*** 0.958*** 0.966*** 0.689***
(0.0653) (0.0688) (0.108) (0.133)
Change in Median Income 0.122** 0.115
(0.0488) (0.116)
Change in Population 1.041*** 0.297
(0.111) (0.215)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 5,362 5,362 3,721 1,767 3,721 538
R-squared 0.224 0.015 0.229 0.285 0.313 0.194 0.045
Number of counties 532 790 790 541 259 541 538
Table 5
Preemption of National Banks and Boom-Bust in Employment in Non-Tradable Sector
The table reports coefficient estimates of WLS regressions relating employment in non-tradable sector to the preemtion of national banks and the increase in the supply of loans induced 
by the preemption, with weights equal to the population of each county. Employment data comes from County Business Pattern and non-tradable sectors are definied according to Main 
and Sufi (2013).  "APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of 
OCC lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is a measure of elasticity of housing supply provided by Saiz (2010).  The results in columns 2 to 6 are for years 2000 to 2006. In column 6, "APL X Post 
X Fraction OCC" is used as an instrument for the log of loan amounts. Subprime counties are defined as counties with the fraction of subprime borrowers above the median. Robust 
standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 2 to 5, are below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
Change in Employment in 
Non-Tradable Sector in 
2003-2005
Employment in Non-Tradable Sector Change in Employment 
in Non-Tradable in 2008-
2010Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6
Subprime 
counties
APL X Post X Fraction OCC -1.402*** -1.001*** -0.971*** -1.794*** -2.278*** 0.823*
(0.399) (0.321) (0.306) (0.457) (0.705) (0.453)
APL 0.574*** -0.0370 -0.0294 -0.106 -0.182 -0.317**
(0.122) (0.0941) (0.0953) (0.133) (0.200) (0.141)
APL X Post 0.447*** 0.455*** 0.693*** 0.854***
(0.104) (0.0991) (0.142) (0.210)
APL X Fraction OCC 0.0251 -0.0362 0.197 0.372
(0.280) (0.283) (0.413) (0.688)
Post X Fraction OCC 0.932*** 0.730*** 0.926*** 0.857*
(0.194) (0.181) (0.287) (0.473)
Fraction OCC -1.408*** -0.411
(0.283) (0.305)
Elasticity -1.194*** -0.0638***
(0.377) (0.0199)
Elasticity X Post 0.0564*** 0.107***
(0.0194) (0.0312)
Log(Median Income) -1.897*** -2.004*** -2.068***
(0.316) (0.398) (0.713)
Log(Population) -0.737* -0.857* -0.633
(0.384) (0.445) (0.679)
Change in Median Income 2.104*** -2.161**
(0.271) (0.864)
Change in Population 3.158*** 0.0667
(0.481) (1.164)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 768 15,533 15,533 5,390 2,758 769
R-squared 0.111 0.008 0.023 0.072 0.093 0.011
Number of counties 768 2,219 2,219 770 394 769
Table 6
Preemption of National Banks and Decline and Subsequent Increase in Mortgages Delinquencies
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the percentage of delinquent mortgages to the preemtion of national banks with weights 
equal to the population of each county. Delinquency is defined as at least 90 days late payments and comes from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel.  
"APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of OCC 
lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is a measure of elasticity of housing supply provided by Saiz (2010).  The results in columns 2 to 5 are for years 2000 to 2006. Subprime counties are 
defined as counties with the fraction of subprime borrowers above the median.  Robust standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 2 to 5, are below the coefficients in 
paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
Change in Delinquency Rates in 
2003-2005
Delinquency Rates Change in Delinquency Rates  
in 2008-2010Full Sample
1 2 3 4
Log of Loan amount House Prices Growth Employment in Non-Tradable Sector Delinquency Rates
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 0.809*** 0.269** 0.165** -1.701***
(0.199) (0.133) (0.07) (0.431)
APL X Post -0.305*** -0.0922** -0.0647*** 0.703***
(0.0616) (0.0466) (0.0207) (0.132)
APL X Fraction OCC -0.0882 -0.0424 -0.0517 0.0428
(0.137) (0.139) (0.0491) (0.415)
Post X Fraction OCC -0.567*** -0.154* -0.0657 0.910***
(0.143) (0.0833) (0.0522) (0.273)
APL 0.00343 -0.0142 0.0118 -0.11
(0.0423) (0.0481) (0.0137) (0.13)
Fraction of Securitized Loans 0.632*** -0.0549 0.182*** -0.390**
(0.0894) (0.115) (0.0305) (0.192)
Log(Median Income) 1.232*** 0.205*** -1.818***
(0.154) (0.0467) (0.419)
Log(Population) 1.294*** 0.959*** -0.879*
(0.16) (0.0619) (0.45)
Elasticity X Post -0.0155* -0.0136 0.00298 0.0373*
(0.008) (0.0111) (0.00245) (0.0198)
Change in Median Income 0.347
(0.211)
Change in Population 0.505***
(0.126)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,322 2,733 3,706 5,322
R-squared 0.254 0.05 0.314 0.079
Table 7
Robustness Test I: Securitization
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the amount of newly originated purchase loans, house prices, employment in non-
tradable sector, and deliqneuency rates to the preemption of national banks with weights equal to the population of each county, controlling for the fraction of loans that 
in each county were securitized. Loan amounts is based on HMDA and is the amount of loans originated for purchainsg a house aggregated at county level for each 
year. House prices are from Zillow.com. Employment data comes from County Business Pattern and non-tradable sectors are definied according to Main and Sufi 
(2013). Delinquency is defined as at least 90 days late payments and comes from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel. Fraction of Securitized 
loans come from BlackBox Logic, which covers 90% of the securitization market. "APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. 
"Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of OCC lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is a measure of elasticity of housing supply 
provided by Saiz (2010).  The results are for years 2000 to 2006. Subprime counties are defined as counties with the fraction of subprime borrowers above the median.  
Robust standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 1 to 4, are below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, 
*=10%).        
1 2 3 4
VARIABLES
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 0.236** 0.237*** -0.280** -0.0434*
(0.0968) (0.0439) (0.116) (0.0247)
APL  -0.0763** -0.0807*** -0.00766 -0.0154*
(0.0313) (0.0134) (0.0386) (0.00860)
APL X Post   
APL X Fraction OCC
Post X Fraction OCC
Log(Median Income)
Fraction OCC 0.0244 -0.00605 0.272*** 0.0318
(0.0580) (0.0176) (0.0733) (0.0227)
Change in County Median Income 0.490*** 0.640***
(0.146) (0.0904)
Constant 0.341*** 0.202*** -0.671*** -0.105***
(0.0226) (0.0108) (0.0251) (0.00755)
Observations 11,567 7,517 11,377 7,451
R-squared 0.114 0.368 0.158 0.398
Table 8
Robustness Test II: State Borders
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the amount of newly originated purchase loans, and house prices to the 
preemption of national banks, with weights equal to the population of the census tract. We restrict attention to tracts within 10 miles from state borders. 
Loan amounts is based on HMDA and is the amount of loans originated for purchainsg a house aggregated at census tract level for each year. House 
prices are from Zillow.com. "APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years 
after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of OCC lenders in 2003 at the census tract level. The results in columns 1 and 2 are for years 2003 to 2005, while 
the results in columns 3 and 4 are for the changes between years 2007 and 2009. Robust standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 1 to 4, are 
below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
Change in Loan Amount  
in 2003-2005
Change in House 
Prices  
Change in Loan 
Amount  in 2007-2009
Change in House 
Prices  in 2008-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Loan amount House Prices Growth Employment in Non-Tradable Sector Delinquency Rates
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 0.779*** 0.374*** -0.0203 -2.206***
(0.280) (0.140) (0.0681) (0.661)
APL  0.0326 0.0129 0.0303* -0.113
(0.0508) (0.0471) (0.0165) (0.129)
APL X Post -0.173** -0.0234 0.00967 0.486***
(0.0771) (0.0361) (0.0184) (0.184)
APL X Fraction OCC -0.175 -0.102 -0.0863* 0.245
(0.166) (0.138) (0.0511) (0.410)
Log(Median Income) 1.679*** 0.0868 0.323*** -2.491***
(0.199) (0.172) (0.0468) (0.473)
Log(Population) 1.148*** 0.302*** 0.871*** -0.501
(0.233) (0.103) (0.0647) (0.562)
Elasticity X Post -0.0328*** -0.00906 -0.00343 0.0311
(0.0112) (0.0105) (0.00334) (0.0239)
Post X Fraction OCC -0.567** -0.176* 0.136** 1.348**
(0.273) (0.107) (0.0674) (0.611)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,842 1,514 2,838 2,842
R-squared 0.238 0.019 0.339 0.068
Number of fips 406 260 406 406
Table 9
Robustness Test III: Only APL States
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the amount of newly originated purchase loans, house prices, employment in non-
tradable sector, and deliqneuency rates to the preemption of national banks with weights equal to the population of each county, restricting attention only to the states 
that at some point in time decided to implement an anti-predatory law. Loan amounts is based on HMDA and is the amount of loans originated for purchainsg a house 
aggregated at county level for each year. House prices are from Zillow.com. Employment data comes from County Business Pattern and non-tradable sectors are 
definied according to Main and Sufi (2013). Delinquency is defined as at least 90 days late payments and comes from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer 
Credit Panel. "APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is 
the fraction of OCC lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is a measure of elasticity of housing supply provided by Saiz (2010). The results are for years 2000 to 2006. Robust 
standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 1 to 4, are below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Loan amount House Prices Growth Employment Non-Tradable Sector Delinquency Rates
APL  0.0271 0.0166 0.0365** -0.115
(0.0539) (0.0499) (0.0174) (0.117)
APL X Post X Fraction OCC 0.782*** 0.311** 0.186*** -1.851***
(0.220) (0.133) (0.0580) (0.463)
APL X Post -0.278*** -0.101** -0.0646*** 0.718***
(0.0671) (0.0445) (0.0178) (0.142)
APL X Fraction OCC -0.108 -0.130 -0.119** 0.217
(0.173) (0.142) (0.0530) (0.361)
Log(Median Income) 1.302*** -0.0494 0.256*** -1.371***
(0.171) (0.130) (0.0365) (0.361)
Log(Population) 1.371*** 0.412*** 1.001*** -1.127**
(0.195) (0.0986) (0.0741) (0.517)
Elasticity X Post -0.0395*** -0.0213*** -0.00400 0.0377**
(0.00866) (0.00622) (0.00246) (0.0182)
Post X Fraction OCC -0.583*** -0.144 -0.0598 1.160***
(0.167) (0.101) (0.0466) (0.298)
CRA_OCC 0.00645 -0.0192 0.00175 0.0249
(0.0164) (0.0165) (0.00435) (0.0376)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,502 2,696 4,499 4,502
R-squared 0.174 0.042 0.311 0.058
Number of fips 764 469 764 764
Table 10
Robustness Test IV: CRA Lending
The table reports coefficient estimates of weighted least square regressions relating the amount of newly originated purchase loans, house prices, employment in non-tradable 
sector, and deliqneuency rates to the preemption of national banks with weights equal to the population of each county and controlling for the lending to small businesses by 
national banks. Loan amounts is based on HMDA and is the amount of loans originated for purchainsg a house aggregated at county level for each year. House prices are from 
Zillow.com. Employment data comes from County Business Pattern and non-tradable sectors are definied according to Main and Sufi (2013). Delinquency is defined as at least 90 
days late payments and comes from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel. "APL" is equal to one if the state has passed anti-predatory law and zero 
otherwise. "Post" is a dummy equal to one for years after 2004. "Fraction OCC" is the fraction of OCC lenders in 2003. "Elasticity" is a measure of elasticity of housing supply 
provided by Saiz (2010). CRA_OCC is the Log of loan amounts to small businesses by OCC lenders with assets above $1 billion. The results are for years 2000 to 2006. Robust 
standard errors , clustered at county level for columns 1 to 4, are below the coefficients in paranthesis.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).        
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Figure 1- Fraction of Lending Done by National Banks in 2003 for Each County 
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Figure 2 – The Relation between the Fraction of Lending Done by National Banks in 2003 and in 2005 for 
Each County 
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Figure 3- Time Series Coefficient for      in Equation (1).  
Note: Coefficient for 2003 is normalized to zero. 
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Chapter 2
The Unintended Consequences of the
Zero-Bound Policy
1
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the nancial crisis of 2007-2008, the Federal Reserve took an unprece-
dented decision to lower short-term nominal interest rates to zero, a policy commonly called
a zero-bound policy. Although this decision had a positive intention of stimulating a faltering
economic growth and boosting employment in the U.S. economy, it has also produced an
adverse shock to competitiveness of money market funds. Since money market funds invest
in instruments that o¤er rates that are close to the Fed funds rate, their gross prot margins
collapsed nearly to zero and many fund investors were facing investment opportunities with
guaranteed negative returns after paying their fund expenses. In this paper, we analyze the
consequences of the interest rate policy for the behavior of money market funds.
The traditional business model of money market funds used to rely on the idea that such
funds o¤er relatively low returns for the provision of ultimate safety. While this idea has
been somewhat shattered with the collapse of the Reserve Primary Fund and the run on
money market funds in September 2008, until then, money market funds o¤ered positive
rates to investors, even after taking into consideration fund expenses. The consequence of
the unprecedented change in the interest rate to levels close to 0% has been that returns
on traditional money market instruments, such as Treasuries, repos, or deposits declined to
similarly low levels. As a result, any fund investing in such assets would guarantee negative
net of expense returns to investors. Hence, it has become obvious that this business model
cannot be sustained as money would ow out of funds with negative returns.
Such dire situation posed a dilemma for money market funds. On the one hand, they
could accept the situation and keep their risk prole as is. This, however, would force them
to rst reduce or even waive their fees, and in the end, if the low-rates situation persist, to
exit the market. On the other hand, funds could reach for yield by shifting their risk into
securities with higher interest rates, thus accepting higher risk in their portfolios.
Money funds might increase the return o¤ered to fund investors by means of reducing
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expenses charged to investors, especially if they are part of larger nancial institutions which
can be willing to subsidize the operation of the money funds. However, funds which struggle
to generate positive returns to their investors can also nd it optimal to increase risk in
their portfolios, which would then lead to an increase in fund returns and potentially fund
ows. As has been documented in Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), money market funds
face a typical positive ow-performance relationship. Given that fund compensation is an
increasing function of ows such strategy would potentially improve the protability of the
funds themselves. Moreover, boosting fund net returns above zero would likely prevent the
fund from ultimate distress and exit from the market. The cost of increasing risk, however,
would be a higher chance of being run on in the event of distress in the money market
industry. The consequence of such runs would be distress of individual funds themselves,
which could generate high costs either in terms of the necessity to bail out the fund or through
the signicant loss of reputation for the fund organization and other related business centered
on fund sponsor.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of the equilibrium response of money funds
to the low interest rates environment. We exploit both a time-series and cross-sectional
variation in the data to identify the e¤ect of monetary policy on money market funds
strategies. Specically, we rst look at the e¤ect of the Fed funds rate on the funds return,
expenses, probability to exit from the industry, and the fundsincentives to take risk. We
show that there exists a strong discontinuity in the e¤ect of the Fed funds rate on these
variables, because the Fed interest rate policy has no signicant e¤ect when the rate is
above one percent, but it becomes very signicant both economically and statistically in a
low interest rate regime. In particular, we nd that a reduction in interest rate leads to a
signicant increase in risk-taking incentives, a reduction in charged expenses, an increase in
fund subsidies, and an increased probability to exit from the market.
Moreover, consistent with the di¤erential incentives shaped by reputational concerns,
we nd that the reaching for yield phenomenon is particularly pronounced for independent
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funds, that is, funds that are not a¢ liated with a commercial bank, an investment bank, or
an insurance company. In contrast, rather than ramping up risk, a¢ liated funds are more
likely to take the path of exiting the market altogether. At the same time, we do not nd
signicant di¤erences across fund types in terms of their expense policy.
To avoid any contamination of our results from other concurrent macro events and further
sharpen our empirical identication, we next turn to evidence from event studies related to
an unprecedented zero-bound interest rate policy introduced by the Fed in the aftermath
of the nancial crisis. In particular, we study the money fund response to four FOMC
announcements, which signaled that interest rates would be kept low in the future. Those
include the original decision in December 2008 to lower Fed funds rate to zero, and subsequent
four decisions of forward guidance policies that provided more details on how long the bound
would be maintained. Important, these decisions were unlikely endogenous with respect to
the behavior of money funds. Within these event windows, we compare the money funds
risk choices, exit decisions, and expense ratios both in the cross-section and in the time
series.
We nd that in the period of three to six months after these announcements, there is
a signicant increase in the probability of exit from the fund industry, fund risk taking
increases, as measured by the funds spread and by the fraction of portfolio invested in
riskier asset classes, and expenses charged by money funds go down and the fund subsidies
go up. Interestingly, while we do not nd any variation in the expenses incurred by these
funds over time, the expenses charged are signicantly reduced during a zero interest rate
period. This result suggests that money funds were actively trying to maintain their net
returns positive as a way of keeping their business alive and did not simply witness a period
of lower operating costs altogether. We also nd signicant di¤erences in the cross-section
of funds consistent with our previous ndings. Following the FOMC decisions, funds that
are a¢ liated with an independent sponsor take on relatively more risk but are less likely to
leave the money fund industry. At the same time we do not observe signicant di¤erences
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in the cost policy across the two groups. These results are consistent with the explanation
in which reputational concerns shape up the strategic decisions of money funds.
Altogether, our results suggest that the unconventional monetary policy implemented
during the nancial crisis by the Fed might have produced unintended consequences regarding
the fragility of an important part of nancial markets, the market for short-term nancing
and shadow banking. Specically, low interest rates can decrease rather than increase the
liquidity available for banks, as one of the main sources of such wholesale funding, the money
market funds, are incentivized to invest in riskier securities when they are not forced to exit
the market altogether.
Furthermore, the results highlight one important channel for monetary policy that has
been completely overlooked by the academic literature, but that is extremely relevant for
practitioners and policy makers. For instance, in August 2009 Fitch released a report about
U.S. money market funds stating that "Over the longer term, more conservative portfolio
composition, combined with the current low interest rate environment, may result in fund
closures, fund consolidation, and/or a resurgent appetite for credit and liquidity risk.
In the same spirit, a recent article on the Financial Times summarized the risks associated
with the zero interest rates as follows:
The risks are that as rates will plunge to zero or negative, money market funds and
their investors would panic as their sources of yield disappeared, and that banks will follow
Bank of New York Mellons lead last year and consider the possibility of charging fees on
deposits. Money market funds would likely be subsidized for a time by their sponsors, but
that cant be counted on to the extent that it was before the crisis. Were this to pass, we
couldnt with any certainty predict the consequences but given the panic that ensued when
Reserve Primary broke the buck, its worth taking none of this lightly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we discuss the related literature.
Section III provides further details about the institutional setting of money market funds.
The empirical design and data, as well as the empirical results are discussed in Section IV
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and Section V, respectively. Section VI concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Several papers have studied the role of money market funds during the nancial crisis, the Eu-
ropean debt crisis, or outside the crisis. These include Christo¤ersen (2001), Christo¤ersen
and Musto (2002), Baba, McCauley, and Ramaswamy (2009), Duygan-Bump, Parkinson,
Rosengren, Suarez, and Willen (2010), McCabe (2010), Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni
(2011), Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Strahan and Tanyeri (2012), Wermers (2012), Cher-
nenko and Sunderam (2012), and Di Maggio (2012).
To the best of our knowledge ours is the rst paper to examine the role of monetary
policy in a¤ecting the risk-taking incentives of money fund managers. In this regard, the
closest papers to ours are Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Strahan and Tanyeri (2012), and
Di Maggio (2012) all of which investigate the risk-taking incentives of money market funds
before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and during the European debt crisis,
respectively. The key di¤erence between these papers and ours is that we examine the role
of the monetary policy to quantify the incentives to reach for yields, to adjust fund expense
policy, and to moderate the entry and exit dynamics of the money fund industry.
More broadly, our paper sheds new light on the incentives for asset managers to reach
for yield, which has been identied as one of the core factors contributing to the buildup
of credit that preceded the nancial crisis (Rajan (2010), Yellen (2011), and Stein (2013)).
There might be several explanations of the reaching-for-yield phenomenon. It could be driven
by competition among fund managers, or it could be a reection of di¤erent preferences for
risk or a desire to o¤set constraints imposed by regulation. The contribution of this paper is
to provide a setting in which the incentives to reach for yield are on the one hand limited by
strict regulation, yet on the other hand they are signicantly a¤ected by changes in interest
rates and expectations about future changes.
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Our paper is also related to studies on the importance of monetary policy for asset prices.
Several papers investigate the response of the Treasury rates and asset prices to the FOMC
announcements (see among others, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), Gürkay-
naka, Sack, and Swanson (2005)) and of the term structure of interest rates to monetary
policy surprises. We contribute to this literature by examining the role of monetary policy
in shaping fund managersincentives to reach for yield.
Finally, our paper has important implications for the vast literature on conducting the
zero interest rate monetary policy (for summary, see Woodford (2003), and Bernanke, Rein-
hart, and Sack (2004)). In this regard, we highlight an important instability outcome that
might be triggered by conducting the zero-bound policy.
2 The Institutional Setting: Money Market Funds
Money market funds (MMFs) are important intermediaries between investors who want
low-risk, liquid investments and banks and corporations that have short-term borrowing
needs. The funds are key buyers of short-term debt issued by banks and corporations:
commercial paper, bank certicates, and repurchase agreements, with an aggregate volume
of $1.8 trillion. Given the importance of short-term credit markets to both investors and
businesses, any disruption represents a potential threat to nancial stability. MMFs have
recently drawn attention of academics as illustrated by a strand of literature exploring their
behavior during the nancial crisis in 2007-2009 (Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) and Gorton
and Metrick (2012)) and the more recent Sovereign debt crisis (Chernenko and Sunderam
(2012) and Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2012)). We contribute to this literature by
showing the impact of the zero interest rates on the fundstrading, cost, and exit strategies.
Money market funds emerged in the 1970s as an alternative to bank deposits. At that
time, bank deposits were highly regulated and paid lower interest rates than did money
market instruments, which made money funds attractive to investors as they paid higher
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interest for taking on comparable risks. Even though the regulation of bank deposits was
eventually abolished, the size of the fund industry grew steadily over time up to $2.4 trillion
at the beginning of 2007 (see Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Data).
An important characteristic of money funds is that, contrary to bank deposits, invest-
ments in the funds are not insured by the government. But, contrary to regular mutual
funds, money funds seek to preserve the value of their assets at $1 per share. They do so by
using historical cost accounting, rather than market value pricing, to assess the value of their
holdings. This allows them to sell demand deposits that are considered almost as safe as
bank deposits. The downside of this approach is that it exposes them to runs. If the market
value of a funds holdings is expected to drop below its amortized cost, investors tend to
redeem their shares, which can exacerbate the market value drop due to forced liquidation
at re-sale prices. Also, funds may su¤er losses on their investments because of changes in
interest rates or individual securitiesdefaults.
In the United States money market fundsholdings are regulated by Rule 2a-7 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. The funds are prohibited from purchasing long-term
assets such as mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, or equity and can only hold
short-term assets; and even these short-term liabilities must be of high quality. As an
additional requirement, to enhance diversication, the funds cannot hold more than 5% of
their assets in the securities of any individual issuer with the highest rating and not more
than 1% in the securities of any other issuer.
In January 2009, after a tumultuous year for money market funds, the SEC voted to
amend the 2a-7 rules to strengthen money market funds. The new rules seek to limit the
risk and improve on fund disclosure. For instance, funds are now required to have enhanced
reserves of cash and readily liquidated securities to meet redemption requests and they can
invest only 3 percent (down from 5 percent) of total assets in tier-2 securities, the term on
which is limited to a maximum maturity of 45 days.
Under the new rules, starting in November 2010 money market funds have make monthly
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disclosure of detailed data, including each funds holdings and shadow net asset value (NAV).
This information becomes available to the public after 60 days. The new N-MFP form on
which it is led constitutes one the main sources of data for the present study.
3 Research Design and Data
3.1 Research Design
In our empirical tests we aim to identify the role of the interest rate policy for money funds
risk-taking behavior, the expense policy, and the likelihood to exit from the market. To this
end, we entertain two empirical strategies. In our rst test, we examine the consequences
of the changes in the Fed funds rate over the longer period of 2005-2013. We restrict our
attention to the period of January 2005December 2013 in order to have a relatively balanced
panel around the time in which the zero-bound policy was introduced. This period includes
two distinct interest rate regimes: A regime in which the rate is higher than zero percent
(2005-2008) and a regime with zero interest rates (2009-2013). As Figure 1 indicates, in the
rst regime the interest rate had been gradually going up from 2% at the beginning of 2005
to 5.25% in the middle of 2007 and then subsequently going down to 0-0.25% by the end of
2008. The second regime has been manifested by a continuous zero interest rate policy (in
fact, the rate has been cut to zero on December 16, 2008).
Our identication in this test comes from the various changes in interest rates over the
sample period. In addition, we examine the di¤erences in fund behavior in periods of high
rates and low rates. In particular, we are interested to learn whether approaching zero bound
alters fund incentives in a signicant way relative to other periods. To this end, we study
fund responses separately in periods with interest rates higher than 1% and in periods with
rates equal to or less than 1%.
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In our second test, we rene our empirical strategy by looking only inside the zero interest-
rate regime. Our analysis of that sub-period allows us to keep the level of interest rates
constant at zero and further explore the importance of the additional communication from the
Federal Reserve regarding the duration of the zero-rate policy. In our context, the duration
of zero rate policy is crucial as it directly determines how long the money market fund
business is subject to prot stress. In particular, one could imagine that short-lasting policy
would have di¤erent equilibrium implications as money funds could withstand temporary
headwinds by taking short-term losses. The situation di¤ers when the pressure is held for
longer time.
In our analysis, we concentrate on the money fund behavior around events related to
FOMCmeetings during which at least one of the following outcomes occurred: (1) a change in
the interest rates, (2) forward guidance announcement. Table 1 provides a short description
of the events in a chronological order. The rst event date is December 16, 2008, which is
the date of the meeting at which the Fed funds rate was cut to 0-0.25%, while the other four
event dates capture the meetings in which the Fed gave its forward guidance regarding the
duration of the zero-rate regime. Specically, on March 18, 2009, the Fed announced that
the rates will be zero for an extended period of time, while on August 9, 2011, January 25,
2012, and September 13, 2012 the Fed stated that the rates will remain at zero until 2012,
2014, and 2015, respectively.
Our event-study analysis requires constructing reasonable windows around event dates.
Given that various money funds decisions can be adapted with di¤erent speed we consider
two horizons: a short-term horizon of three months after the event and a long-term horizon
of six months after the event. In both cases, the pre-event window is set at one month as
we want to ensure that no pre-event trends drive the patterns in our data. Our empirical
strategy is to compare the average fund behavior around the event date.
In both empirical tests, we also exploit cross-sectional di¤erences across money market
funds. In particular, we distinguish between funds whose sponsors are a¢ liated with a
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large nancial institution, such as commercial bank, investment bank, or insurance company
and funds whose sponsors are a¢ liated with an independent asset management company.
We believe the two groups might exhibit distinct responses to the events of interest rate
changes. For example, the bank-a¢ liated funds might exhibit weaker incentives to reach
for yield than independent funds to limit the probability of the bad outcome in which the
bank would be forced to invest resources to save the fund. Independent funds, in turn, have
stronger incentives to reach for yield in order to provide investors with higher returns, which
should compensate the investors for giving up the implicit insurance of the bank. Moreover,
bank-a¢ liated funds might have reputation at stake in which case they might prefer to exit
the less risky yet unprotable fund industry rather than improve its protability by ramping
up risk.
3.2 Data
We collect data from four sources. First, we obtain data on the universe of taxable money
market funds from iMoneyNet, which cover the period from January 2005 to December
2013 and include weekly fund-level data on yields, expense ratios (charged and incurred),
average maturity, holdings by instrument type, and fund sponsor. Second, we complement
the data with information from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, especially assets under
management of the fund sponsor. Third, we use COMPUSTAT and companieswebsites for
information on fund sponsor characteristics. Similar data, though for a di¤erent time pe-
riod, have been already used and additionally discussed in Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013).
Fourth, we gather detailed information about Fed funds rate changes and the forward guid-
ance policy from the Federal Reserve Board website.
We conduct our analysis at the fund portfolio level. We therefore aggregate all share
classes by fund and type of investor (retail, institutional). We compute fund characteristics
(e.g., expense ratio) as the weighted average with assets per share class as weights. Some
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funds o¤er both retail and institutional share classes. Institutional shares are generally
larger; hence, we classify a fund as institutional if it o¤ers at least one institutional class and
as retail if it does not o¤er institutional share classes.
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the data. In columns (1) and (2), we provide
information about mean and standard deviation of various fund and sponsor characteristics
in the entire sample period. Our sample includes 349 di¤erent fund portfolios. The average
fund size in our sample equals approximately $8.3 billion. The average portfolio maturity is
40 days and the average fund age equals 15.8 years. The average Fed funds rate in our sample
equals 182 basis points while the average gross fund return equals 231 basis points. Out of
the abnormal prot of 48 basis points 38 basis points account for expenses, which leaves
about 10 basis points accruing to fund investors. Notably, our sample is quite balanced with
respect to sponsor type as 59% of funds have bank-a¢ liated sponsors and 41% are sponsored
by independent asset management companies.
In the subsequent four columns, we compare sample properties between the high-rate
and low-rate regimes. This sample split is based on the median interest rate equal to 1%
and reects our view of what we consider a period of prot stress. Comparing the two
sub-samples we note a number of interesting patterns. First, the spread during the low-rate
period is 25% lower than that in the high-rate period; also, the nominal gross return was
almost ten times larger in the high-rate period. This suggests that money market funds faced
greater challenges in obtaining high returns in a low interest rate environment. Second, if
we look at the expenses charged they are signicantly lower in the low-rate period, with a
drop from 50 to 28 basis points, while the expenses incurred remain almost the same. This
suggests that while the costs were not a¤ected by the monetary policy, the stress imposed
on the prot margin reduced the possibility for the fund to charge fees to the investors. In
other words, funds were more likely to o¤er subsidies to their fund investors. Third, while
fund ows are positive during the earlier period, they become negative in the low interest
rate environment. This is consistent with the idea that investors have become less willing to
11
make investments in money market funds as their returns became less attractive. Finally,
we observe a signicant decline of more than 50 in the number of funds over the two periods:
from 326 to 274 funds in the second period, which constitutes a signicant exit from this
sector.
In the last four columns of Table 2 we focus only on the period of low interest rates
and report separate summary statistics for two major groups of funds: bank a¢ liated and
independent. Bank-a¢ liated funds are dened as funds sponsored by a commercial bank,
an investment bank, or an insurance company. Bank-a¢ liated funds are on average smaller
with the di¤erence of about $3 billion. They are also less risky as their spreads are lower;
they invest in shorter maturity assets as well as in safer assets as repos and Treasuries.
They also charge slightly lower expenses, and they face higher outows, consistent with the
ow-performance relationship observed in other studies (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013)).
3.3 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the main results of the paper. First, we illustrate the importance
interest rates play in generating fund returns and illustrate the link between fund returns and
subsequent fund ows. Next, we look at the e¤ects on risk taking, fund exit, and expenses
of changes in the Fed funds rate near the zero interest rate bound and compare them to
any other changes in interest rates before the zero-bound policy. Finally, we zero in on the
e¤ects within the low interest rate policy and examine similar behavior around the FOMC
interest rate and forward guidance announcements.
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4 The E¤ect of the Fed Funds Rate Changes
4.1 Flow-Performance Relationship
We begin our analysis by identifying the link between interest rate and gross fund return.
To this end, we estimate the regression model of fund returns (Fund Return) on the Fed
funds rate over the entire sample period. In this regression model, we control for other
determinants of fund returns possibly correlated with the level of interest rates, such as the
natural logarithm of fund size (Log(Fund Size)), the natural logarithm of fund family size
(Log(Family Size)), the level of expenses charged by funds (Expenses), the natural logarithm
of fund age (Age), the percentage change in fund assets accounted for capital appreciation
(Fund Flow), the standard deviation of fund ows (Fund Flow Volatility), and an indicator
variable for the fund that is institutional (Institutional). Further, we account for any time-
invariant fund and sponsor characteristics by introducing fund-xed and sponsor-xed e¤ects.
To address a potential concern that interest rates do not vary across fund observations within
given week and thus Fed funds rate might simply proxy for the time trends in the data we
also include year-xed e¤ects. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the time dimension to
address the possibility that interest rates are identical across fund observations. We report
the results in Table 3.
Our results show that fund performance is higher in periods of higher interest rates.
The e¤ect is statistically and economically highly signicant. Specically, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the interest rate leads to an increase of 128-194 basis points in the fund
return, more than 60% change in terms of one standard deviation of fund returns. This
result underscores the importance of interest rate regimes for generating fund performance.
In the next test, we show that generating superior performance has important implica-
tions for fund ows and hence for fund manager compensation. To this end, we estimate the
standard ow-performance relationship. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) demonstrate the
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presence of such a relationship in the pre-Lehman period for the subsample of institutional
money funds. Here we examine this relationship for all prime funds over the longer time
period and separately for the high-rate and low-rate regimes. Our set of controls mimics that
used in Table 3. However, given the nature of the data in some specications we account for
the ner week-level variation by introducing week-xed e¤ects. In all regressions we cluster
standard errors at the fund sponsor level. Table 4 reports the results.
In column (1) we report the results for the full sample of money funds. We conrm the
ndings from earlier studies that investors exhibit strong sensitivity to fund past returns.
The coe¢ cient of Fund Return is positive and highly statistically signicant. It is also
economically signicant: A one-standard-deviation increase in Fund Return results in a
fund ow of about 1.9% per week, which is approximately 40% of the standard deviation
of fund ows in the data. In terms of fund size, it means over the year a fund with a one-
standard-deviation higher return than the average would almost double its size relative to
the average fund.
In column (2), we also show that fund ows are positively correlated with the Fed funds
rate, which is a direct consequence of our earlier ndings in Table 3. In column (3), we further
show that the ow-performance relationship does not depend on the level of interest rates,
as the coe¢ cient of the interaction term Fund Return*Fed Rate is statistically insignicant.
This result however is obtained without properly accounting for week-xed e¤ects and does
not account for potential nonlinearities in which interest rates a¤ect the sensitivity. To this
end, in columns (4) and (5) we further provide estimates of the ow-performance relationship
separately for the period with high interest rates and low interest rates.
At rst glance, it seems that the ow-performance relationship is stronger in periods of
lower interest rates as the coe¢ cient of Fund Return is about 30% larger in that sample.
Hence, we conclude that the changes in interest rates altered considerably the payo¤per unit
of extra performance. What has also changed is the level of fund performance which made
investors less attracted to money funds and triggered signicant fund responses in terms of
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their exit, risk-taking, and expense strategies. We now discuss each of these adjustments.
4.2 Adjustments along Exit, Risk-Taking, and Expense Strategies
Since interest rate environment directly a¤ects prot opportunities it is becoming increas-
ingly more di¢ cult for funds to operate protably as the interest rates approach zero rate
bound. Consequently, they might need to adjust along various margins, such as their exit
strategies, their risk, and expense policy.
We begin by analyzing the e¤ect of the Fed rate on the number of active funds and on
the probability of their exit. To this end, we estimate the regression model for each of the
two dependent variables on the level of Fed funds rate using a full sample of funds and two
sub-samples based on the level of interest rates. Apart from the standard controls we used
before, all regressions include year/month-xed e¤ects and sponsor-xed e¤ects. We cluster
standard errors at the week level. Table 5 reports the results.
Overall, we nd little e¤ect of higher interest rates on exiting or attrition in this industry
in the full sample as highlighted by columns (1) and (4). However, signicant di¤erences
emerge when we compare results across two interest-rate regimes. While we again nd little
e¤ect of interest rate changes on exit strategies in the high-rate regime, as evidenced in
columns (2) and (5), we nd that the changes in interest rates from 1% towards zero have
a very important implications for fund exit, as demonstrated in columns (3) and (6). In
particular, we nd that by reducing the Fed rate from 1% to 0% the number of funds in our
sample decreases by about 11.3, and the probability of exiting from the industry increases by
7.2%. Both e¤ects are highly signicant both statistically and economically. Notably, in this
specication, we include very ne year/month-xed e¤ects, which makes it highly unlikely
that we are picking up the time trend, or the e¤ect of some unobserved macro shock.
We next turn to the fundsincentives to take risk. We use four di¤erent measures of risk,
similar to those used in Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013). Spread is the di¤erence between
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Fund Return and the rate on Treasury bill; Holdings Risk is a long-short portfolio invested
long in the riskiest asset class (bank obligations) and short in the safest asset class (Repos
and U.S. Treasuries and Agency assets); Maturity Risk is the weighted average maturity of
the fund; Concentration is a Herndhal index of the portfolio holdings in risky assets, such as
commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper, oating-rate notes, and bank obligations.
Higher values of each measure indicate a greater degree of risk taking. We estimate the
regression model in which the dependent variables are various risk measures and the main
independent variable is Fed Rate. As before, all regressions include year/month-xed e¤ects
and sponsor-xed e¤ects, and standard errors are clustered at the week dimension. We
report the results in Table 6. Given our interest in the e¤ects of low-rate policy we only
report results for the low-rate regime; the high-rate regime results are signicantly weaker
and omitted for brevity.
We nd a statistically signicant positive e¤ect of reducing Fed Rate on the level of risk
for three out of four risk measures. The e¤ect is negative, but statistically insignicant for
Maturity Risk. In terms of economic values, a reduction in the Fed Rate from 1% to 0%
increases Spread by almost 95 basis points Holdings Risk by 6.8 percent, and Concentration
by 2.4%. These are sizable e¤ects, especially for the money funds with returns close to zero.
Our last dimension of adjustment is the expense policy. It is apparent that in the wake
of low interest rates and thus low returns fund companies might want to maintain their
client relationship by reducing the fees charged to their investors, e¤ectively increasing these
investorsnet returns. We want to contrast this behavior with the expenses that are truly
incurred by the funds which are more di¢ cult to adjust. In addition, we measure the degree
of subsidies that funds o¤er to their investors by taking the di¤erence between incurred and
charged expenses. We estimate the regression model in which Charged Expenses, Incurred
Expenses, and Subsidy are our dependent variables and Fed Rate is our main independent
variable. All other controls are the same as before. However, in contrast to previous regres-
sions, we cluster standard errors at the sponsor level since fund expenses seem to be quite
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persistent over time and thus this dimension of dependence produces more conservative stan-
dard errors. Table 7 reports the results from the estimation for the full sample and the two
sub-samples of high and low rates.
The results, in columns (1), (4), and (7), indicate a general negative e¤ect of interest
rates on fund expenses, both charged and incurred, and a positive e¤ect on fund subsidies.
However, this result is largely driven by the high-rate regime (columns (2), (5), and (8)),
that is, fund expenses are generally lower when interest rates are higher, perhaps because
funds have generally higher prot margins and do not need to charge much for their service.
However, the opposite is true when interest rates approach zero bound: Lower rates reduce
the expenses charged by the funds. As the Fed Rate goes down from 1% to 0% funds charge
7.6 basis points less for their service, as presented in column (3). This reduction occurs
despite the fact that fund incurred expenses are generally una¤ected by the interest rate
change, as demonstrated in column (6). This asymmetric response in expenses is equivalent
to an increase in fund subsidies o¤ered to investors. As presented in column (9), a decrease
in Fed Rate from 1% to 0% increases fund subsidy by an economically large 6.6 basis points.
This e¤ect is statistically and economically highly signicant.
4.3 Evidence from the Cross-Section of Funds
So far, we based our results on the time-series identication strategy, that is, we compared
changes in fund behavior across di¤erent levels of the Fed funds rate. In this section, we
further buttress our identication strategy using cross-sectional variation in the incentives to
respond to prot margin squeeze across di¤erent fund sponsors. As we have demonstrated,
fund sponsors might want to respond to margin deterioration either by changing their exit,
their risk, or expenses strategies. However, these responses also might depend on other
concerns. In particular, fund sponsors with greater reputation concerns at stake or greater
ability to provide funding in case of the run might want to internalize these negative spillovers
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by either taking less risk or leaving the industry altogether. They might also entertain
di¤erent pricing strategies. In our sample, we postulate that the important dimension of
di¤erences is whether the fund is sponsored by a nancial institution (with large concerns
and greater ability to pay) or is sponsored by an independent asset management company
(usually with less reputation concern and smaller ability to pay).
We explore these di¤erences empirically using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences regression ap-
proach. In particular, we want to compare exit, risk taking, and expenses strategies for
funds with di¤erent sponsor type across High-Rate and Low-Rate regimes. To this end, we
dene two indicator variables: Independent Sponsor equal to one if the sponsor is an inde-
pendent company and zero if it is a nancial institution; Low Rate equal to one if the Fed
Rate is at most 1% and zero if the rate is above 1%. The di¤erential e¤ect of the change
in the interest rate regime across two fund types will be measured by the coe¢ cient of the
interaction term Independent Sponsor* Low Rate.
In Table 8, we present the results for the number of funds and exit strategies. All regres-
sions include year/month-xed and sponsor-xed e¤ects. We nd a positive and statistically
signicant e¤ect of the interaction term for the number of funds: There are relatively more
funds sponsored by independent companies in the low-rate regime. At the same time, the
results indicate little evidence of di¤erences across fund types in terms of their exit strategies.
Table 9 reports the results for the risk measures. In all regressions, we include week-
xed e¤ects; thus eliminating any possible e¤ects due to time trends. Consistent with our
hypothesis that independent funds might have less at stake in terms of their risk taking, we
nd that such funds, on average, take on more risk when the monetary policy shifts to lower
interest rate regime. This e¤ect is statistically and economically large for all four measures of
risk. Specically, relative to a¢ liated funds, the spread of independent funds increases by 2.4
basis points, holdings risk increases by 7.3 basis points, funds maturity risk increases by one
third of the standard deviation, or equivalently by 4.5 days on average, and concentration
increases by 3.8 percentage points. In all regressions, the coe¢ cient of Independent Sponsor
18
is not statistically di¤erent from zero, which suggests the two groups of funds are similar to
each other in high-rate periods.
We entertain similar tests for two measures of expenses and subsidy and report the
results in Table 10. Although independent sponsors are on average less likely to subsidize
their funds, we nd no statistically signicant di¤erential e¤ect between the independent
funds and the bank-a¢ liated funds in terms of expense strategies. These results suggest
that even though funds, in general, lower their expenses in the low-rate regime they do not
execute this strategy in economically distinct ways.
4.4 Fund Strategies around the FOMC Announcements
Up to this point we have analyzed the e¤ect of Fed funds rate on di¤erent outcome variables
over di¤erent sample periods, also taking advantage of the cross-sectional di¤erences across
fund sponsors. In this section, we turn into our second empirical strategy in which we
evaluate fund behavior, both in the time series and in the cross-section around the important
decisions taken by the FOMC during the low interest rate period. As we have argued before
there are ve events in which the Fed has signaled important information regarding the level
and duration of the zero interest rate policy. We study the changes in fund behavior before
and after such events, also conditional on fund sponsor type. Our main variable in all tests
is Event which is an indicator variable equal to one for the period after the event date and
zero beforehand.
In our analysis, we consider two types of windows: We rst look at the interval between
one month before and three months after the event, then we investigate the e¤ect over a
longer time interval as we compare the outcome over the six months after the event compared
to the month before the event. We restrict attention to one month before the event to avoid
any contamination with other potential events. We analyze these two types of windows
because there are strategies that the funds can immediately alter, such as the riskiness of
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their portfolio or expense policy, but also other strategies for which we might not observe
any e¤ect for an extended period of time, such as the exit from the market.
We begin with the analysis of the exit strategy. Panel A of Table 11 reports the results.
We nd that, on average, three funds drop after the event both in the shorter and longer time
window. Similarly, we nd that the probability of exiting the industry increases signicantly
in both horizons following the event. We have reported the results for all the events together,
but we nd consistent results for each event separately. Moreover, later events are more
important than early ones, perhaps the forward guidance policy extended the low-rate regime
into a longer future with more certainty. In sum, our results indicate that there is indeed
tension in the industry generated by the monetary policy.
Panel B shows a similar event study analysis but conditional on the sponsor type. The
incremental e¤ect of change with respect to sponsor type is measured by the coe¢ cient of
the interaction term Event*Independent Sponsor. We nd that the independent funds are
more likely to stay and less likely to exit because these are the funds which are less wary of
any reputational concerns due to runs. Instead, these funds o¤set their protssqueeze by
increasing their risk taking to attract more investors. The result is particularly strong for
the longer six-month window, which is consistent with our premise that adjustments, such
as exit might take longer to materialize.
Next, we perform a similar analysis for the risk-taking incentives. The results are reported
in Panel A and Panel B of Table 12. We nd that as a result of strengthening the policy
of the zero interest rate, three out of four measures of fund riskiness increase. The only one
that in fact goes down is Maturity Risk. But this is likely driven by the provision in the
Dodd-Frank Act which implemented a signicantly higher lower bound for the fraction of
assets maturing within the next seven days that money market funds need to hold. The
results in the cross-section of funds, reported in Panel B, generally paint a picture that
funds sponsored by independent asset management companies take on more risk following
the change in the interest rate policy. This result is true again for the same three measures
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of risk as before. Overall, these results are consistent with our earlier nding that lowering
interest rates makes such funds reach for yield relatively more.
Finally, we investigate changes in the expense policy. The results are reported in Panel
A (for the time series) and Panel B (for the cross-section) of Table 13. Consistent with the
previous ndings, we nd that the expenses charged (fund subsidies) get reduced (increased)
following the FOMC events. These e¤ects are particularly strong for the longer, six-month
window, which might reect some stickiness with which fund companies generally respond
in terms of their expense policies. Again, we nd no di¤erences across fund types in terms of
their expense policies. Notably, many funds often waive their expenses to investors, especially
in the low-rate regimes, another dimension of adjustment which can be used to alleviate the
pressure due to low interest rate policy.
To the extent that the FOMC events trigger attrition in the fund industry the worry is
that our results for risk taking might be mechanically di¤erent by di¤erences in the sample
selection before and after the events. To the extent that safer funds were more likely to exit
we could observe an increase in average risk taking even though individual funds might not
change their policies at all. We address this concern by focusing on a subset of funds that
are present in both periods around the event date. In Table 14, we present the results from
the estimation of regression models similar to those in Table 12. The results we nd are
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those reported before; thus, our results are
unlikely to be driven by the di¤erential selection within the event window.
In sum, our results corroborate our earlier ndings that money funds respond to pressures
in their business due to unusually low interest rates either by increasing the riskiness of their
portfolios, lowering (increasing) the expenses (subsidies) they charge to their investors, or
leaving the fund industry altogether. The strength of these e¤ects tends to vary with the
fund sponsor, especially when it comes to dimensions of risk and exit.
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the consequences of the zero interest rate policy on the money mar-
ket fundsbehavior. The monetary policy has a direct e¤ect on money market funds as
these primarily invest in asset classes whose returns are linked to the Fed funds rate. This
constitutes a great setting to explore the unintended consequences that monetary policy may
have on nancial markets.
We uncover novel empirical evidence showing that the low interest rate regime leads fund
managers to increase the risk of their portfolios in order to generate positive returns. The
e¤ect is more pronounced for funds sponsored by asset management companies. Almost all
funds signicantly reduced their expenses charged, even if the incurred expenses did not vary
much over time, as an attempt to deliver non-negative net returns to their investors. These
subsidies amounted to an economically large value of $27 million per average fund and about
$7.3 billion for all funds. We also show that the funds that are not successful in retaining
their investorsbase, or are worried about possible negative reputation spillovers, are more
likely to leave this market as a response to the cuts in interest rates.
22
6 References
Adrian, T., Kimbrough K., and Marchioni, D. (2010), The Federal Reserves Commercial
Paper Funding Facility, Sta¤ Report no. 423, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Baba, N., McCauley, R., and Ramaswamy, S. (2009), US Dollar Money Market Funds
and non-US Banks, BIS Quarterly Review, March.
Bernanke, B., Reinhart, V., and Sack, B. (2004), Monetary Policy Alternatives at the
Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2004(2),
1-100.
Chernenko, S., and Sunderam, A. (2012), Frictions in Shadow Banking: Evidence from
the Lending Behavior of Money Market Funds, Fisher College of Business Working Paper,
(2012-4).
Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G. (1997), Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 114(2), 389-432.
Christo¤ersen, S. K. (2001), Why Do Money Fund Managers Voluntarily Waive Their
Fees?, Journal of Finance 56(3), 1117-1140.
Christo¤ersen, S. K. and Musto, D. K. (2002), Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money
Management, Review of Financial Studies 15(5), 1499-1524.
Di Maggio, M. (2013), Market Turmoil and Destabilizing Speculation, Columbia Busi-
ness School Working Paper.
Duygan-Bump, B., Parkinson, P., Rosengren, E., Suarez, G. A., & Willen, P. (2013),
How E¤ective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, The
Journal of Finance 68(2), 715-737.
Gorton, G. B., & Metrick, A. (2012), Who Ran on Repo? (No. w18455). National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., and Swanson, E. T. (2005), Do Actions Speak Louder
23
Than Words? The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements,
International Journal of Central Banking.
Ivashina, V., Scharfstein, D. S., and Stein, J. C. (2012), Dollar Funding and the Lending
Behavior of Global Banks(No. w18528). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kacperczyk, M., and Schnabl, P. (2013), How Safe are Money Market Funds?, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(3), 1073-1122.
Krishnamurthy, A., and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2012), The Aggregate Demand for Trea-
sury Debt, Journal of Political Economy 120(2), 233-267.
McCabe, P. (2010), The Cross Section of Money Market Fund Risks and Financial
Crises, Federal Reserve Board Working Paper.
Rajan, R. (2010), Fault Lines, Princeton University Press.
Stein, J. C. (2013, February). Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement,
and Policy Responses.Speech delivered at Restoring Household Financial Stability after
the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter,a symposium sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis.
Strahan, P., and Tanyeri, B. (2012), Once Burned, Twice Shy: Money Market Fund
Responses to a Systemic Liquidity Shock, Boston College Working Paper.
Wermers, R. (2012), Runs onMoneyMarket Mutual Funds, Available at SSRN 2024282.
Woodford, M. (2003), Interest Rates and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary
Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Yellen, J. (2011), Remarks at the International Conference: Real and Financial Linkage
andMonetary Policy, Bank of Japan, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110601a.htm.
24
  
Figure 1: Fed Funds Rate: 2005-2013 
The figure presents the evolution of Fed funds rate over the period 2005-2013. 
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Table 1: Zero Interest Rate Policy Events (ZIRP) 
We report the dates of FOMC meetings in which the Fed decided to change the Fed funds 
rate or provided policy guidance about the prevailing zero interest rate policy. 
Date Event 
December 16, 2008 Fed funds rate reduced to 0-0.25 
March 18, 2009 Zero rates for extended time period 
August 9, 2011 Zero rates at least until 2013 
January 25, 2012 Zero rates at least until 2014 
September 13, 2012 Zero rates at least until 2015 
 
  
2 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The sample is all prime money market funds. The data span the period January 2005-December 2013. The first two columns provide the results for the entire sample over the full period.  
The subsequent two columns (High Rate) restrict the sample to the period of high interest rates (Fed funds rate greater than 1%). In the next two columns (Low Rate), we restrict the 
sample to the period of low interest rates (Fed funds rate between 0 and 1%). The following four columns focus on the low-rate regime and summarize the data of funds whose sponsors 
are affiliated with a financial institution (Affiliated) and for funds whose sponsors are independent asset management companies (Independent). 
Variable Unconditional High Rate Low Rate Low Rate: Affiliated Low Rate: Independent 
 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Fed Rate (in %) 1.83 2.02 3.65 1.31 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.15 
Fund Return (in bps) 231.07 206.28 419.13 114.58 46.95 53.23 46.41 52.78 47.72 53.84 
Spread (in bps) 47.24 53.84 53.85 61.78 40.74 43.74 40.14 43.14 41.60 44.56 
Holdings Risk (in %) -8.30 27.98 -5.13 26.19 -11.37 29.29 -14.34 27.32 -7.17 31.38 
Maturity (in days) 40.29 13.05 39.55 12.85 41.00 13.21 39.12 12.77 43.66 13.36 
Concentration (in %) 27.63 17.52 31.91 18.43 23.50 15.52 23.37 16.36 23.69 14.25 
Expenses Charged (in bps) 38.54 25.38 49.69 27.98 27.63 16.37 27.16 16.60 28.29 16.02 
Expenses Incurred (in bps) 56.99 32.38 58.36 32.62 55.65 32.10 53.74 28.30 58.34 36.63 
Subsidy 18.34 27.33 8.50 20.50 27.97 29.65 26.53 25.58 30.01 34.48 
Fund Size 8303 21651 7083 17173 9481 25176 8102 24211 11430 26356 
Family Size 151599 253903 122320 204508 182160 293725 113790 118291 279344 415854 
Age (in years) 15.80 7.86 13.40 7.04 18.13 7.91 17.28 7.87 19.33 7.81 
Fund Flow (in %) 0.05 4.78 0.26 5.24 -0.16 4.28 -0.19 4.64 -0.12 3.70 
Fund Flow Volatility (in %) 3.66 3.86 4.12 4.27 3.21 3.37 3.57 3.52 2.70 3.08 
Independent Sponsor (in %) 40.92 49.17 40.37 49.07 41.44 49.26 0 0 100 0 
Bank Affiliated Sponsor (in %) 59.08 49.17 59.63 49.07 58.56 49.26 100 0 0 0 
Sponsor Equity 10117 17052 9955 16742 10275 17345 16580 19918 1374 5492 
U.S. Treasuries & Agency 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.20 
Repurchase Agreements 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.15 
Bank Deposits 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.07 
Bank Obligations 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.15 
Floating-Rate Notes 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 
Commercial Paper 0.30 0.22 0.34 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.19 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper  0.11 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.11 
Institutional Funds (in %) 45.94 46.76 45.73 46.71 46.14 46.81 47.63 46.81 44.02 46.72 
Number of Funds 349 326 274 159 115 
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Table 3: Fund Returns and Fed Funds Rate 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013. The 
dependent variable is Fund Gross Return computed as the annualized return.  Fed Rate is the annualized Fed 
funds rate.  Control variables include the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family 
assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage 
change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of 
fund flow growth, and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and 
zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level.  Column (1) includes year-fixed effects, column (2) 
includes fund-fixed effects, column (3) includes sponsor-fixed effects, and column (4) includes year-fixed 
and sponsor-fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the week level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Fund Gross Return 
          
Fed Rate 62.291*** 93.025*** 94.370*** 62.291*** 
 
(5.087) (1.012) (0.963) (5.087) 
Log(Fund Size) 1.260*** 16.683*** 5.170*** 1.260*** 
 
(0.061) (1.292) (0.361) (0.061) 
Log(Family Size) 1.038*** 3.556*** 5.754*** 1.038*** 
 (0.095) (0.779) (1.034) (0.095) 
Expenses 20.641*** 118.308*** 86.409*** 20.641*** 
 
(1.957) (8.642) (6.641) (1.957) 
Log(Age) 0.453 -5.946*** -8.508*** 0.453 
 
(0.331) (1.382) (1.358) (0.331) 
Fund Flow 21.525*** 10.017 15.402* 21.525*** 
 
(5.265) (8.677) (9.193) (5.265) 
Fund Flow Volatility -32.930*** 104.429*** 98.761*** -32.930*** 
 
(4.181) (13.735) (13.816) (4.181) 
Institutional 4.842*** -9.791*** 13.391*** 4.842*** 
 (0.353) (1.198) (1.004) (0.353) 
Constant 87.400*** -116.116*** -42.169*** 87.400*** 
  (9.498) (15.848) (12.965) (9.498) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes 
Fund-Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 98,496 98,496 98,496 98,496 
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Table 4: The Flow-Performance Relationship 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013.  The dependent 
variable is Fund Flow, computed as the percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1, adjusted for 
market appreciation. Fed Rate is the annualized Fed funds rate. Fund Return is the annualized fund return. Control 
variables include the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, expense ratio (charged), 
the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change in total net assets from time t to time 
t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an indicator variable equal to one if the 
fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and include 
sponsor-fixed effects.  High Rate restricts the sample to the period of high interest rates (Fed funds rate greater than 
1%).  Low Rate restricts the sample to the period of low interest rates (Fed funds rate between 0 and 1%). Columns 
(1), (4), and (5) additionally include week-fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the fund sponsor level.  ***, 
**, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Full Sample High Rate Low Rate 
            
Fund Return 0.009*** 
 
0.003*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fed Rate 
 
0.001*** -0.002* 
  
  
(0.000) (0.001) 
  Fed Rate*Fund Return 
  
0.000 
  
   
(0.000) 
  Log(Fund Size) -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expenses -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.007* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fund Flow Volatility 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.092*** 0.042* 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) 
Institutional -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.018*** -0.013** -0.011** -0.002 -0.022*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week-Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 98,948 98,974 98,948 50,572 48,376 
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Table 5: Fund Exit and Fed Funds Rate 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013.  The dependent variables are Number of 
Funds, defined as the number of funds in a given period, and Exit, defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the fund exits the fund 
industry in week t.  Fed Rate is the annualized Fed funds rate.  Control variables include the annualized fund return, the natural logarithm of 
fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a 
percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an 
indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and 
include year/month-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects.  High Rate restricts the sample to the period of high interest rates (Fed funds rate greater 
than 1%).  Low Rate restricts the sample to the period of low interest rates (Fed funds rate between 0 and 1%). Standard errors are clustered at 
the week level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Number of Funds Exit 
 
Full Sample High Rate Low Rate Full Sample High Rate Low Rate 
              
Fed Rate 0.654 0.515 11.310*** 0.002 0.004 -0.072*** 
 
(0.478) (0.697) (3.063) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) 
Fund Return -0.061 -0.248** 0.174** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.001 
 
(0.061) (0.101) (0.070) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.001 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -0.001 0.005** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Expenses -0.015* -0.017* -0.058** -0.014*** -0.023*** -0.011** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.028) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age 0.003** 0.005* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Fund Flow 0.038 0.022 0.087 -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.081) (0.107) (0.113) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) 
Fund Flow Volatility -0.017 -0.093*** 0.034 0.037*** -0.005 0.076*** 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) 
Institutional -0.004** -0.006** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 290.883*** 291.512*** 175.000*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.018* 
  (0.927) (1.337) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Year/Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,792 50,334 48,458 98,792 50,334 48,458 
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Table 6: Fund Risk and Fed Funds Rate (Low-Rate Regime) 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds.  The dependent variables are: the weekly annualized spread (Spread), 
the fraction of assets held in risky assets, net of the riskless assets (Holdings Risk), average portfolio maturity (Maturity 
Risk), and portfolio concentration, defined as a Herfindahl Index of asset classes (Concentration). Fed Rate is the 
annualized Fed funds rate.  Control variables include the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of 
family assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change 
in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an 
indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are 
at the weekly level and include year/month-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects.  The sample is restricted to the period of 
low interest rates (Fed funds rate between 0 and 1%). Standard errors are clustered at the week level.  ***, **, * 
represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration 
          
Fed Rate -94.917** -6.770** 0.924 -0.024* 
 
(46.443) (3.070) (4.121) (0.014) 
Log(Fund Size) 0.400*** 1.690*** 0.208*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.099) (0.042) (0.026) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -2.371*** 0.694*** -0.395 0.009*** 
 (0.604) (0.260) (0.290) (0.002) 
Expenses 1.996*** 0.243 0.969*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.439) (0.265) (0.193) (0.001) 
Fund Flow -37.591*** -6.721** -12.627*** 0.216*** 
 
(2.455) (2.798) (1.413) (0.012) 
Fund Flow Volatility 4.346*** -3.275*** 11.074*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.737) (1.160) (0.502) (0.006) 
Institutional -15.650*** -18.582*** -15.326*** 0.024*** 
 (1.479) (1.299) (1.049) (0.007) 
Constant -0.070 2.586*** -1.076*** 0.002 
  (0.140) (0.171) (0.129) (0.001) 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,322 46,065 46,054 46,065 
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Table 7: Fund Expenses and Fed Funds Rate 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013.  The dependent variables are Charged Expenses, defined as percentage expense rate 
charged by a fund, Incurred Expenses, defined as percentage expense rate incurred by a fund, Subsidy, defined as the difference between incurred and charged expenses.  Fed Rate is the 
annualized Fed funds rate.  Control variables include the annualized fund return, the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, the natural logarithm of 
fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an indicator 
variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and include year-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects.  High 
Rate restricts the sample to the period of high interest rates (Fed funds rate greater than 1%).  Low Rate restricts the sample to the period of low interest rates (Fed funds rate between 
0 and 1%). Standard errors are clustered at the sponsor level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Charged Expenses Incurred Expenses Subsidy 
 
Full Sample High Rate Low Rate Full Sample High Rate Low Rate Full Sample High Rate Low Rate 
                 
Fed Rate -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.076*** -0.002 0.003** 0.009 0.004*** 0.007*** -0.066*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.007*** -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.046*** -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(Family Size) 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.010*** -0.000 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age 0.009*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.010*** 0.027*** 0.005 -0.011*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Fund Flow 0.009 0.018 0.015 0.003 0.031** -0.038 0.007 0.029*** -0.045 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) (0.037) (0.019) (0.010) (0.040) 
Fund Flow Volatility -0.946*** -1.104*** -0.524*** -0.631*** -0.734*** -0.593*** 0.290*** 0.345*** -0.089 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.035) (0.023) (0.089) (0.037) (0.015) (0.096) 
Institutional -0.206*** -0.323*** -0.099*** -0.318*** -0.336*** -0.317*** -0.111*** -0.012*** -0.217*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) 
Constant 0.542*** 0.848*** 0.439*** 0.982*** 1.122*** 0.789*** 0.417*** 0.249*** 0.626*** 
 
(0.019) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.035) (0.027) (0.013) (0.038) 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,792 50,334 48,458 98,484 50,186 48,298 98,484 50,186 48,298 
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Table 8: Fund Exit and Fed Funds Rate: Conditioning on Sponsor Type 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013.  The dependent variables are 
Number of Funds, defined as the number of funds in a given period, and Exit, defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the 
fund exits the fund industry in week t.  Low Rate is an indicator variable equal to one if the Fed funds rate is less than or equal 
1%, and zero otherwise.  Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an independent asset 
management company, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include the annualized fund return, the natural logarithm of fund 
assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as 
a percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund 
flow, and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions 
are at the weekly level and include year/month-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the week level.  
***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Number of Funds Exit 
 
    
Low Rate -0.623 -0.009 
 (0.581) (0.008) 
Independent Sponsor*Low Rate 0.003** 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Fund Return -0.046 -0.013*** 
 (0.060) (0.003) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Expenses -0.017** -0.014*** 
 
(0.007) (0.002) 
Age 0.003** 0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Fund Flow 0.033 -0.029*** 
 
(0.082) (0.008) 
Fund Flow Volatility -0.013 0.037*** 
 
(0.020) (0.010) 
Institutional -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 292.123*** 0.058*** 
  (0.113) (0.010) 
Year-Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Sponsor-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 98,795 98,795 
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Table 9: Fund Risk and Fed Funds Rate: Conditioning on Sponsor Type 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013.  The dependent variables 
are: the weekly annualized spread (Spread), the fraction of assets held in risky assets, net of the riskless assets (Holdings Risk), 
average portfolio maturity (Maturity Risk), and portfolio concentration, defined as a Herfindahl Index of asset classes 
(Concentration). Low Rate is an indicator variable equal to one if the Fed funds rate is less than or equal 1%, and zero 
otherwise.  Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an independent asset management 
company, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of 
family assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change in 
total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an indicator 
variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly 
level and include week-fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the week level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration 
          
Independent Sponsor -0.239 -0.130 -0.904 -0.026 
 
(0.893) (2.535) (1.042) (0.020) 
Independent Sponsor*Low Rate 2.449** 7.328** 4.519*** 0.038** 
 
(1.224) (2.905) (1.170) (0.017) 
Log(Fund Size) 0.847*** 3.029*** 0.540* -0.009** 
 
(0.277) (0.634) (0.314) (0.005) 
Log(Family Size) 0.867** 2.776*** 0.427** -0.013*** 
 (0.361) (0.746) (0.209) (0.005) 
Expenses 5.652** 10.423** 0.565 0.022 
 
(2.426) (4.892) (1.978) (0.036) 
Age 2.624* 2.216 3.655*** 0.055** 
 
(1.548) (2.943) (1.338) (0.026) 
Fund Flow 0.522 -40.494* 9.170 -0.255** 
 
(7.537) (21.799) (8.570) (0.111) 
Fund Flow Volatility -31.457** -85.261** -54.163*** -0.583*** 
 
(13.800) (36.820) (16.366) (0.194) 
Institutional 2.469* 4.215 -0.298 -0.024 
 (1.327) (2.963) (1.045) (0.020) 
Constant 16.236** -75.077*** 15.104* 0.232* 
  (8.237) (15.476) (8.017) (0.128) 
Week-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 94,521 95,264 95,253 95,264 
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Table 10: Fund Expenses and Fed Funds Rate: Conditioning on Sponsor Type 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds over the period January 2005-December 2013.  The dependent 
variables are Charged Expenses, defined as percentage expense rate charged by a fund, Incurred Expenses, defined as 
percentage expense rate incurred by a fund, Subsidy, defined as the difference between incurred and charged 
expenses. Low Rate is an indicator variable equal to one if the Fed funds rate is less than or equal 1%, and zero 
otherwise.  Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an independent asset 
management company, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include the annualized fund return, the natural 
logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow 
computed as a percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, 
standard deviation of fund flow, and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional 
investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and include week-fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the sponsor level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Charged Expenses Incurred  Expenses Subsidy 
 
     
Independent Sponsor 0.012 0.062 0.049* 
 
(0.027) (0.040) (0.027) 
Independent Sponsor*Low Rate -0.013 -0.031 -0.018 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.030) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.017*** -0.048*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
Log(Family Size) 0.002 0.008 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
Age 0.023 -0.005 -0.027 
 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020) 
Fund Flow 0.005 -0.009 0.001 
 
(0.018) (0.035) (0.033) 
Fund Flow Volatility -1.006*** -0.640*** 0.341* 
 
(0.156) (0.240) (0.175) 
Institutional -0.190*** -0.291*** -0.099*** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) 
Constant 0.505*** 1.008*** 0.496*** 
  (0.097) (0.168) (0.135) 
Week-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,795 98,484 98,484 
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Table 11: Fund Exit and ZIRP Shocks 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds.  The dependent variables are Number of Funds, defined as the number of 
funds in a given period, and Exit, defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the fund exits the fund industry in week t.  The 
estimation window includes one month before and three months (in columns (1) and (2)) and six months (in columns (3) and 
(4)) after the event dates defined in Table 1.  Event is an indicator variable equal to one for the period after the event date and 
zero for the period before the event date.  Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an 
independent asset management company, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include the annualized fund return, the natural 
logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund 
flow computed as a percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard 
deviation of fund flow, and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  
All regressions are at the weekly level and include year-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the week 
level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Exit and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Number of Funds Exit Number of Funds Exit 
 
3 Months Ahead 6 Months Ahead 
          
Event -3.248*** 0.002** -2.789*** 0.002** 
 
(0.809) (0.001) (0.764) (0.001) 
Fund Return 3.899*** -0.001 6.569*** -0.002 
 
(0.690) (0.002) (0.862) (0.002) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.012* -0.001** -0.023*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -0.171 -0.003 -0.146 -0.003* 
 (0.130) (0.002) (0.103) (0.002) 
Expenses -0.801*** -0.014*** -0.298 -0.019*** 
 
(0.260) (0.005) (0.438) (0.005) 
Age 0.298** 0.001* 0.280** 0.002** 
 
(0.129) (0.001) (0.134) (0.001) 
Fund Flow -1.515 -0.065** -1.110 -0.055** 
 
(1.129) (0.026) (0.903) (0.022) 
Fund Flow Volatility 3.734*** 0.068** 4.881*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.607) (0.030) (0.611) (0.030) 
Institutional -0.070* -0.002** 0.047 -0.003*** 
 (0.040) (0.001) (0.059) (0.001) 
Constant 237.789*** 0.042 181.502*** 0.039** 
  (2.280) (0.028) (1.581) (0.019) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,568 18,568 25,914 25,914 
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Panel B: Conditioning on Sponsor Type and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Number of Funds Exit Number of Funds Exit 
 
3 Months Ahead 6 Months Ahead 
          
Event -3.280*** 0.002*** -2.862*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.803) (0.001) (0.767) (0.001) 
Event*Independent Sponsor 0.077 -0.002 0.178** -0.003** 
 
(0.067) (0.002) (0.081) (0.001) 
Fund Return 3.900*** -0.001 6.574*** -0.002 
 
(0.689) (0.002) (0.861) (0.002) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.012* -0.001** -0.023*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -0.172 -0.003 -0.150 -0.003* 
 (0.130) (0.002) (0.103) (0.002) 
Expenses -0.802*** -0.013*** -0.309 -0.019*** 
 
(0.260) (0.005) (0.436) (0.005) 
Age 0.298** 0.001* 0.281** 0.002** 
 
(0.129) (0.001) (0.134) (0.001) 
Fund Flow -1.515 -0.065** -1.106 -0.055** 
 
(1.130) (0.026) (0.905) (0.022) 
Fund Flow Volatility 3.727*** 0.068** 4.888*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.605) (0.030) (0.611) (0.030) 
Institutional -0.070* -0.002** 0.045 -0.003*** 
 (0.040) (0.001) (0.059) (0.001) 
Constant 237.790*** 0.042 181.543*** 0.038* 
  (2.283) (0.027) (1.587) (0.019) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,568 18,568 25,914 25,914 
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Table 12: Fund Risk and ZIRP Shocks 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds.  The dependent variables are: the weekly annualized spread (Spread), the fraction of assets held in risky assets, net of the riskless 
assets (Holdings Risk), average portfolio maturity (Maturity Risk), and portfolio concentration, defined as a Herfindahl Index of asset classes (Concentration).  The estimation window 
includes one month before and three months (in columns (1) -(4)) and six months (in columns (5)-(8)) after the event dates defined in Table 1.  Event is an indicator variable equal 
to one for the period after the event date and zero for the period before the event date.  Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an independent 
asset management company, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, expense ratio (charged), 
the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change in total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of 
fund flow, and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and include 
year/month-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects (in Panel A) and year/month-fixed effects (in Panel B). Standard errors are clustered at the week level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Fund Risk and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration 
 
3 Months Ahead 6 Months Ahead 
                  
Event 34.329*** 0.954*** -1.216** 0.005*** 21.341** 0.879*** -1.347*** 0.005*** 
 
(12.113) (0.323) (0.503) (0.002) (10.471) (0.271) (0.386) (0.001) 
Log(Fund Size) 0.311*** 1.672*** 0.244*** 0.002*** 0.251*** 1.645*** 0.248*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.087) (0.051) (0.043) (0.000) (0.073) (0.048) (0.034) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -7.141*** 0.632 -0.065 0.013*** -4.828*** 0.435 0.472 0.011*** 
 (1.528) (0.524) (0.516) (0.004) (1.177) (0.395) (0.423) (0.003) 
Expenses 3.950*** 2.043*** 1.898*** 0.015*** 3.140*** 1.296*** 1.659*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.914) (0.335) (0.289) (0.002) (0.697) (0.313) (0.246) (0.002) 
Age -63.297*** -5.511 -14.730*** 0.173*** -52.901*** -2.220 -10.630*** 0.197*** 
 
(5.856) (3.417) (2.111) (0.021) (4.554) (3.474) (2.152) (0.018) 
Fund Flow 2.211* 0.002 10.502*** -0.041*** 1.566 -0.739 9.684*** -0.037*** 
 
(1.286) (1.955) (0.854) (0.012) (1.043) (1.641) (0.681) (0.010) 
Institutional -23.283*** -13.671*** -22.086*** 0.002 -21.940*** -19.000*** -21.336*** -0.011 
 (3.680) (2.358) (1.544) (0.008) (2.649) (2.182) (1.330) (0.007) 
Constant -0.208 3.497*** -0.732*** 0.010*** -0.459** 3.350*** -0.738*** 0.008*** 
  (0.235) (0.250) (0.152) (0.001) (0.193) (0.268) (0.189) (0.001) 
Year/Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,830 16,882 16,879 16,882 23,462 23,527 23,524 23,527 
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Panel B: Conditioning on Sponsor Type and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration 
 
3 Months Ahead 6 Months Ahead 
                  
Independent Sponsor -3.837 6.642** 4.768*** -0.000 -0.776 5.681 5.107*** -0.011 
 
(2.878) (3.309) (1.366) (0.020) (2.940) (3.492) (1.484) (0.021) 
Independent Sponsor*Event 9.215*** 1.821*** -1.010** 0.008** 4.646*** 3.405** -1.897*** 0.026*** 
 
(1.239) (0.634) (0.460) (0.004) (1.668) (1.533) (0.709) (0.007) 
Log(Fund Size) 1.358** 3.102*** 0.559 -0.009* 1.121** 3.168*** 0.503 -0.008 
 
(0.601) (0.889) (0.444) (0.005) (0.514) (0.871) (0.440) (0.005) 
Log(Family Size) 1.132* 3.542*** 0.347 -0.012** 0.936* 3.336*** 0.427 -0.013** 
 (0.663) (0.939) (0.304) (0.005) (0.559) (0.904) (0.293) (0.005) 
Expenses 15.013** 15.387** -2.012 0.046 13.661*** 15.591** -2.208 0.052 
 
(5.818) (6.780) (3.046) (0.041) (4.966) (6.588) (2.981) (0.040) 
Age 11.336*** 4.921 7.683*** 0.085*** 9.207*** 3.969 7.367*** 0.087*** 
 
(3.351) (4.337) (2.137) (0.032) (2.932) (4.171) (2.164) (0.032) 
Fund Flow 3.399 -42.839 15.279 -0.248* 3.629 -45.113* 16.330 -0.247* 
 
(15.427) (26.417) (9.695) (0.129) (12.685) (25.876) (10.039) (0.127) 
Fund Flow Volatility -61.994** -53.305 -60.787*** -0.397* -52.152** -57.933 -60.876*** -0.403** 
 
(25.558) (43.026) (18.732) (0.209) (21.349) (42.253) (18.776) (0.204) 
Institutional 6.432** 8.657** -0.656 -0.006 5.285** 8.297** -0.567 -0.006 
 (2.908) (3.824) (1.505) (0.021) (2.481) (3.668) (1.472) (0.021) 
Constant -34.986* -111.568*** -3.997 -0.012 -25.810 -104.344*** -2.431 -0.027 
 
(18.869) (23.029) (12.725) (0.160) (16.505) (22.463) (12.892) (0.159) 
Year/Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,830 16,882 16,879 16,882 23,462 23,527 23,524 23,527 
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Table 13: Fund Expenses and ZIRP Shocks 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds.  The dependent variables are Charged Expenses, defined as percentage 
expense rate charged by a fund, Incurred Expenses, defined as percentage expense rate incurred by a fund, Subsidy, defined 
as the difference between incurred and charged expenses.  The estimation window includes one month before and three 
months (in columns (1)-(3)) and six months (in columns (4)-(6)) after the event dates defined in Table 1.  Event is an 
indicator variable equal to one for the period after the event date and zero for the period before the event date.  
Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an independent asset management company, 
and zero otherwise.  Control variables include the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, 
expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change in total net assets 
from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an indicator variable equal 
to one if the fund is offered to institutional investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and 
include year-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects (in Panel A) and week-fixed effects (in Panel B). Standard errors are clustered 
at the sponsor level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Expenses and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Charged Incurred Subsidy Charged Incurred Subsidy 
 
3 months ahead 6 months ahead 
            
Event -0.001 -0.002** -0.002 -0.014** -0.003*** 0.010** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.006*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.005*** -0.044*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(Family Size) 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.006** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age 0.010*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.031*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fund Flow -0.028 -0.006 0.029 -0.024 -0.005 0.028 
 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) 
Fund Flow Volatility -0.699*** -0.804*** -0.127* -0.641*** -0.833*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.057) (0.044) (0.074) (0.044) (0.035) (0.061) 
Institutional -0.133*** -0.318*** -0.184*** -0.120*** -0.317*** -0.196*** 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
Constant 0.445*** 0.648*** 0.167*** 0.197*** 0.566*** 0.337*** 
 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.042) (0.034) (0.032) (0.039) 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,568 18,506 18,506 25,914 25,829 25,829 
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Panel B: Conditioning on Sponsor Type and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Charged Incurred Subsidy Charged Incurred Subsidy 
 
3 months ahead 6 months ahead 
 
          
Independent Sponsor -0.003 0.030 0.032 -0.006 0.029 0.034 
 
(0.020) (0.039) (0.027) (0.022) (0.039) (0.027) 
Independent Sponsor*Event 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) 
Log(Fund Size) -0.006 -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.006 -0.047*** -0.040*** 
 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) 
Log(Family Size) 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) 
Age 0.015 -0.002 -0.016 0.016 0.002 -0.014 
 
(0.013) (0.026) (0.022) (0.012) (0.026) (0.023) 
Fund Flow -0.022 0.003 0.035 -0.012 0.004 0.032 
 
(0.033) (0.046) (0.047) (0.029) (0.038) (0.039) 
Fund Flow Volatility -0.789*** -0.592* 0.166 -0.751*** -0.599** 0.115 
 
(0.149) (0.299) (0.240) (0.134) (0.287) (0.242) 
Institutional -0.115*** -0.290*** -0.175*** -0.102*** -0.291*** -0.188*** 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.024) (0.015) (0.033) (0.025) 
Constant 0.327*** 1.020*** 0.687*** 0.287*** 0.996*** 0.701*** 
 
(0.081) (0.188) (0.152) (0.074) (0.194) (0.162) 
Week-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,568 18,506 18,506 25,914 25,829 25,829 
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Table 14: Fund Risk and ZIRP Shocks—Conditioning on Survival 
The sample is all U.S. prime money market funds.  The dependent variables are: the weekly annualized spread (Spread), the fraction of assets held in risky assets, net of the riskless 
assets (Holdings Risk), average portfolio maturity (Maturity Risk), and portfolio concentration, defined as a Herfindahl Index of asset classes (Concentration).  The estimation window 
includes one month before and three months (in columns (1)-(4)) and six months (in columns (5)-(8)) after the event dates defined in Table 1.  Event is an indicator variable equal to 
one for the period after the event date and zero for the period before the event date.  We restrict our estimation to the sample of funds that are present in both periods before and 
after the event.  Independent Sponsor is an indicator variable equal one if the fund sponsor is an independent asset management company, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include 
the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of family assets, expense ratio (charged), the natural logarithm of fund age, fund flow computed as a percentage change in 
total net assets from time t to time t+1 adjusted for market appreciation, standard deviation of fund flow, and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offered to institutional 
investors and zero otherwise.  All regressions are at the weekly level and include year/month-fixed and sponsor-fixed effects (in Panel A) and year/month-fixed effects (in Panel B). 
Standard errors are clustered at the week level.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fund Risk and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration 
 
3 Months Ahead 6 Months Ahead 
                  
Event 34.329*** 0.954*** -1.216** 0.005*** 21.341** 0.879*** -1.347*** 0.005*** 
 
(12.113) (0.323) (0.503) (0.002) (10.471) (0.271) (0.386) (0.001) 
Log(Fund Size) 0.311*** 1.672*** 0.244*** 0.002*** 0.251*** 1.645*** 0.248*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.087) (0.051) (0.043) (0.000) (0.073) (0.048) (0.034) (0.000) 
Log(Family Size) -7.141*** 0.632 -0.065 0.013*** -4.828*** 0.435 0.472 0.011*** 
 (1.528) (0.524) (0.516) (0.004) (1.177) (0.395) (0.423) (0.003) 
Expenses 3.950*** 2.043*** 1.898*** 0.015*** 3.140*** 1.296*** 1.659*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.914) (0.335) (0.289) (0.002) (0.697) (0.313) (0.246) (0.002) 
Age -63.297*** -5.511 -14.730*** 0.173*** -52.901*** -2.220 -10.630*** 0.197*** 
 
(5.856) (3.417) (2.111) (0.021) (4.554) (3.474) (2.152) (0.018) 
Fund Flow 2.211* 0.002 10.502*** -0.041*** 1.566 -0.739 9.684*** -0.037*** 
 
(1.286) (1.955) (0.854) (0.012) (1.043) (1.641) (0.681) (0.010) 
Institutional -23.283*** -13.671*** -22.086*** 0.002 -21.940*** -19.000*** -21.336*** -0.011 
 (3.680) (2.358) (1.544) (0.008) (2.649) (2.182) (1.330) (0.007) 
Constant -0.208 3.497*** -0.732*** 0.010*** -0.459** 3.350*** -0.738*** 0.008*** 
  (0.235) (0.250) (0.152) (0.001) (0.193) (0.268) (0.189) (0.001) 
Year/Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sponsor-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,830 16,882 16,879 16,882 23,462 23,527 23,524 23,527 
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Panel B: Conditioning on Sponsor Type and Monetary Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration Spread Holdings Risk Maturity Risk Concentration 
 
3 Months Ahead 6 Months Ahead 
                  
Independent Sponsor -3.748 6.178* 4.633*** -0.008 -0.979 5.382 5.016*** -0.016 
 
(2.837) (3.305) (1.355) (0.023) (2.893) (3.476) (1.469) (0.022) 
Independent Sponsor*Event 9.167*** 2.507*** -0.823* 0.020* 4.972*** 3.865** -1.776** 0.034*** 
 
(1.212) (0.801) (0.473) (0.011) (1.631) (1.556) (0.702) (0.010) 
Log(Fund Size) 1.367** 3.104*** 0.558 -0.009* 1.124** 3.171*** 0.501 -0.008 
 
(0.601) (0.889) (0.444) (0.005) (0.514) (0.871) (0.440) (0.005) 
Log(Family Size) 1.132* 3.541*** 0.346 -0.012** 0.935* 3.336*** 0.427 -0.013** 
 (0.664) (0.939) (0.304) (0.005) (0.560) (0.904) (0.293) (0.005) 
Expenses 15.085** 15.406** -2.019 0.046 13.689*** 15.613** -2.217 0.052 
 
(5.819) (6.778) (3.047) (0.041) (4.965) (6.586) (2.982) (0.040) 
Age 11.204*** 4.882 7.694*** 0.085*** 9.156*** 3.929 7.385*** 0.087*** 
 
(3.367) (4.339) (2.138) (0.032) (2.936) (4.172) (2.165) (0.032) 
Fund Flow 3.334 -42.871 15.281 -0.248* 3.592 -45.149* 16.336 -0.248* 
 
(15.402) (26.403) (9.696) (0.129) (12.675) (25.859) (10.040) (0.127) 
Fund Flow Volatility -61.740** -53.231 -60.808*** -0.396* -52.045** -57.844 -60.907*** -0.402* 
 
(25.537) (43.025) (18.733) (0.209) (21.338) (42.252) (18.777) (0.204) 
Institutional 6.473** 8.666** -0.660 -0.006 5.298** 8.305** -0.573 -0.006 
 (2.908) (3.823) (1.505) (0.021) (2.480) (3.667) (1.472) (0.021) 
Constant -34.490* -111.411*** -4.036 -0.011 -25.613 -104.192*** -2.501 -0.026 
 
(18.921) (23.038) (12.728) (0.160) (16.520) (22.468) (12.896) (0.159) 
Year/Month-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,830 16,882 16,879 16,882 23,462 23,527 23,524 23,527 
 
 
 
Chapter 3
Information Sharing, Social Norms and
Performance
1
1 Introduction
A recurrent economic problem in organizations is how to use available knowledge e¢ -
ciently. Information, however, is often dispersed among agents, which prevents optimal
decisions if communication is absent. One important consequence is that organizations
operating in markets requiring specialized knowledge can underperform. Credit, insur-
ance, and nancial markets are but a few examples. Agents might, in fact, decline a
loan to a reliable client or fail to identify the appropriate risk class for a new client. In-
stead, when communication is available, agents can acquire information from co-workers
in the organization. As Hayek (1945) pointed out: it is a problem of the utilization of
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.
In the same spirit, Arrows 1974 seminal work on the limits of organization argues that
one key activity of any organization is internal communication. He has also pointed out
that the trade-o¤ between the cost of communication and the benet of communication
lies at the core of the agenda of organizations.
The e¤ects of improved communication on productivity are in fact not obvious ex
ante. On the one hand, low-skill agents may ask others for direction, thus communication
might improve performance through a learning e¤ect. On the other hand, high-skill agents
might spend a larger fraction of their time helping others, which could negatively a¤ect
their performance, via a substitution e¤ect as they swap information provision tasks
for work completion tasks. Furthermore, even when production and use of information
are not explicitly rewarded, a strategic motive might drive agents away from e¢ ciency.
Consider a high-skill worker facing the opportunity to share his knowledge with others.
He might use this as an instrument to signal his ability in order to increase his chances of
promotion. Alternatively he might prefer to hoard his knowledge to prevent a competitor
from overtaking him on the ladder to promotion. Similarly, a low-skill worker might
be reluctant to ask others for information required to complete his tasks out of fear
of revealing his low ability. There exists then an internal job market signaling e¤ect
on behalf of high ability and an adverse selection e¤ect on behalf of low ability workers,
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Table 1: Competing Hypotheses
Hypothesis Information Consumption Hypothesis Information Production
People who ask questions People who answer
" : Learning gain skill & advice and " : Signaling questions are higher skill
are more productive. and more productive.
People who ask questions People who answer
# : Adv. Select. are lower skill # : Substitution questions are distracted
and less productive. and less productive.
which inuences agentsdecisions. These e¤ects are summarized in Table 1 where diagonal
entries represent causal e¤ects and o¤-diagonal entries represent selection e¤ects. Finally,
it is challenging to empirically disentangle the e¤ects of communication versus those of
innate ability regarding an agents performance and demand for information.
The e¤ect of knowledge sharing has recently attracted scholarsattention as one of
main factors driving consumption and saving decisions (Moretti (2011) and Duo and
Saez (2003)), the creation of new technologies (Ja¤e et al. (1993)) and adoption of
technology (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995); Kremer and Miguel (2007); Conley and Udry
(2010)). Our study extends this literature by empirically investigating how information
sharing and communication a¤ect loan o¢ cersproductivity within a large commercial
bank. Moreover, by doing so we are also able to understand what drives the o¢ cers
demand for information. We analyze these issues within the corporate division of a
global bank primarily located in Japan. Starting in 2003, the bank implemented an online
platform to allow employees to access information from headquarters and to share their
private information with each other. Every employee gained online access to documents
provided by headquarters as well as the ability to pose questions of and provide answers to
other employees. Adopting this new technology allowed for more e¢ cient communication,
both vertically, between headquarters and bank branches, and horizontally among loan
o¢ cers.
Information provided by bank headquarters mainly concerns legal and taxation issues,
new nancial instruments and services provided by the organization, and general policy
guidelines as well as details about the most successful management practices to adopt.
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The information exchanged by loan o¢ cers is more often related to clients, for exam-
ple, account management, credit worthiness, deal closure, collecting debts, and avoiding
defaults. This provides us with a natural environment in which to understand how com-
munication, and information sharing generally, a¤ects productivity.
We exploit two unique properties of our dataset. First, we have very detailed data
on the performance of each loan o¢ cer inside the bank for the two-year period 2006-
2008. We observe the individual-level targets set by bank headquarters and the results
achieved by each o¢ cer along a number of di¤erent dimensions, such as gross prot, loan
volume and revenues. Since these measures are expressed in yen and easily quantiable,
the performance of the agents on these dimensions constitutes our objective performance
measure. However, we also collected the branch managers evaluations of each loan
o¢ cers performance on softer more informal dimensions, such as his or her contributions
to branch operations and customer service. These evaluations can be interpreted as
subjective performance measures because they are not directly related to the attainment
of a pre-determined target. Moreover, as reported by the bankers these evaluations try
to correct for luck and to reward o¢ cerse¤orts.
Second, we are able to exploit a source of exogenous variation coming from an anti-
corruption law that requires loan o¢ cers to switch branches every two to ve years.
This allows us to use an instrumental variable procedure in order to assess the causal
e¤ect of information sharing on employeesproductivity. Moreover, our results are not
contaminated by incentive considerations, in fact, there is no material incentive to use the
new technology. Hence, if acquiring knowledge from others became an important part of
the loan o¢ cers job, it is exclusively due to the reliability and the productivity benets of
access to available information. Furthermore, the banking sector in Japan is very di¤erent
from that in the United States. In particular, the incentive system implemented by this
bank provides loan o¢ cers with only de minimus end-of-year bonuses, so incentives are
almost exclusively constituted by the possibility of promotion.
This paper provides two main sets of results. First, exploiting the longitudinal dimen-
sion of our data, we are able to identify a signicant positive e¤ect of information sharing
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on performance. Moreover, we also highlight what is the main mechanism through which
communication a¤ects performance. We provide evidence that low-skill agents benet the
most from acquiring information from others. The magnitude of the e¤ect is large and
signicant. In fact, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity over time, between branches
and among o¢ cers, a standard deviation increase in information access increases perfor-
mance by more than ten percent. This supports the idea that agents might under-perform
because they are not aware of more successful management practices implemented else-
where or lack the information necessary to ll the gap (Bloom et al. (2011)) and might
acquire soft information from other loan o¢ cers to improve their knowledge of the local
credit market conditions (Stein (2002)). We can also conclude that asking questions and
providing answers to others is mainly driven by innate ability, as captured by individual
xed e¤ects. Intuitively, low-ability agents, in an attempt to improve their performance,
are more likely to ask questions of their peers.
Second, we exploit the source of exogenous variation by restricting attention to agents
who switched branches. We can study how job rotation a¤ects (1) the demand for infor-
mation and (2) the o¢ cersperformance. We nd that they tend to increase their demand
for information immediately after switching jobs. However, this e¤ect declines over time.
That job rotation increases information demand supports the hypothesis that learning is
a major factor a¤ecting performance and that mostly soft rather than hard information
is shared with peers. Intuitively, when a loan o¢ cer is forced to switch branches, he
does not possess, for example, the knowledge of the local market conditions to assess the
reliability of new clients. Without the ability to communicate with more experienced
o¢ cers, whom he also has trouble identifying, an o¢ cers productivity can su¤er.
Restricting our attention to switchers,gives us the opportunity to investigate their
performances in the new branches. We nd strong evidence that switching negatively
a¤ects their performance and, after the switch, they perform on average signicantly
worse than before. This result is of independent interest as it suggests specialized human
capital is destroyed when they move to a di¤erent branch. This is surprising because we
are considering the same worker within the same organization, controlling for regional and
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branch di¤erences. This nding contributes to the labor literature on the accumulation
and destruction of specialized human capital and the e¤ect of worker displacement.1 As
we discuss in section 6, this presents us with an opportunity to quantify and bound the
costs associated with the anti-corruption law.
Finally, we further exploit the mandatory switching of loan o¢ cers across branches
in order to assess the causal e¤ect of communication and information sharing on per-
formance. Motivated by branch variation in usage of the information-sharing platform,
we construct an instrument based upon the attitudes of a branch towards the new tech-
nology. For each o¢ cer i; our instrument is the amount of information accessed in the
previous branch excluding o¢ cer i: That is, if specic o¢ cer A works in a branch where
problems are usually resolved within the branch and without attempting to nd the so-
lutions elsewhere in the organization, then when o¢ cer A moves to a di¤erent branch, he
will tend to communicate less with other o¢ cers in other branches. In contrast, if o¢ cer
A works for a branch where access to information provided by others is encouraged, he
will tend to communicate more across the organization when in the new branch. In other
words, our instrument is based on the idea that social norms tend to be developed within
branches and have an enduring e¤ect on loan o¢ cersbehaviors.
We nd even stronger results than those found with the estimation of the longitu-
dinal model. This provides further evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there exists
substitution between the loan o¢ cersabilities and the amount of information to which
they have access. Moreover, this suggests that in contrast to the o-ring theory formulated
by Kremer (1993), which predicts that the productivity of each worker is increasing in
the skill level of his co-workers, we nd an asymmetric e¤ect. While we observe that the
opportunity to share information with high-skill workers increases the low-skill workers
productivity, we do not observe any negative e¤ect on the high-skill workersperformance.
The signicance of our instrument suggests that agents take into account their peers
behavior, when deciding how to cope with their daily tasks. For example, suppose loan
1Seminal papers in this strand of the literature include Hamermesh (1987), Ruhm (1991), and Jacob-
son and Sullivan (1993). For an early survey see Kletzer (1998).
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o¢ cer A is facing a taxation issue with one of his corporate clients. Our results show
that, not only will he be more inclined to ask questions if he has underperformed in the
past (i.e. indicating a low-ability agent), but he will be more inclined to do so if his peers
behave in the same way. That is, there exists a complementarity in information sharing:
the higher the number of o¢ cers who consult their colleagues, the higher is the incentive
for each of them to continue sharing information. This might be explained by the absence
of competition and the lower risk of being identied as a low-ability agent which is based
on having provided information.2 Moreover, we show that it is more likely for o¢ cer A
to meet his targets and improve his performance, by solving his taxation issue with the
help of others, than by taking an uninformed decision.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section places this paper in relation to
existing literature. Section 2 discusses the institutional background, and describes our
data. Section 3 explains our approach and the methodology we employ to estimate the
e¤ect of information sharing on performance. Section 4 presents the rst set of results
for the e¤ect of communication on performance, and the e¤ect of switching on informa-
tion demand and productivity. Section 5 presents the main results of our instrumental
variable estimates, and discuss additional evidence supporting the validity of our instru-
ment. Section 6 analyzes the relevance of our results for three di¤erent issues: theory
of tournaments, cost of regulation, and relational banking. Section 7 summarizes and
concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Since Marschak and Radner (1972) pioneering work, team theory has theoretically inves-
tigated issues similar to our own and the literature has developed around the idea that
information ows, and not just incentives, drive agentsbehaviors inside an organization.
3 More recently, Garicano (2000) presents a theoretical model of hierarchical organization
2For an interesting overview of the economic literature on corporate culture see Hermalin (2007).
3Sah and Stiglitz (1986), for example, is an early attempt to compare decision-making in di¤erent
organizational forms when agents possess heterogeneous information. Other important contributions
in this literature include Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and Van Zandt (1999) which highlight the
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of expertise, which is applicable to our setting. Decisions involve problem solving and
thus acquiring the relevant knowledge for each decision. There exists a trade-o¤ between
information acquisition costs and communication costs because agents can directly ac-
quire information at a cost or elicit the relevant information from others at a higher level
in the organization. The latter is costly because agents at the higher levels need to spend
time solving problems faced by others, i.e. what we call the substitution e¤ect. Our em-
pirical understanding of these issues lags far behind, as data on information ows within
rms is seldom collected and it is hard to disentangle the e¤ect of information sharing
on individual productivity from other confounding factors. This paper addresses some
of these issues as we had the opportunity to collect individual-level data on performance
and information ows within a large commercial bank.4
The behavior of loan o¢ cers has been the object of few recent studies. Hertzberg et al.
(2010) show that a rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan o¢ cers to borrowers of
an Argentinian commercial bank a¤ects the o¢ cersreporting behavior, while Agarwal
and Ben-David (2012) run a controlled eld experiment within a bank which shows an
increase in defaults when the incentive structure of a subset of small business loan o¢ cers
was altered from xed salary to volume-based pay. While they focus on the loan o¢ -
cersagency problems, we analyze how communication among o¢ cers might signicantly
improve their productivity. The role of organizational design and loan o¢ cersbehavior
has been highlighted by Berger et al. (2005), they nd that large banks are less willing
to engage in information-intensive loans for which soft information is more important.
Similarly, Liberti and Mian (2009) nds that greater hierarchical/geographical distance
between the information collecting agent and the loan approving o¢ cer leads to less re-
liance on subjective information and more on objective information, while Agarwal and
Hauswald (2010) nd that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft informa-
tion. We nd that loan o¢ cers performance decreases when they are forced to switch
importance of hierarchies to diminish the costs related to processing information that ows through the
network of contacts.
4Bloom et al. (2009) employ an international data set in order to investigate the e¤ect of information
technology and communication on worker autonomy, plant manager autonomy, and span of control. We
complement their analysis by focusing on the loan o¢ cersperformance and their demand for information.
7
branch, which suggests that the acquisition of soft information about local businesses is
one of the main factors driving loan o¢ cersproductivity.
The di¤usion of information technologies (IT) has been associated with an increase
in productivity in organizations (see for example the survey by Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(2000)). However, empirically identifying the e¤ect of IT on productivity and ascertaining
the channel through which it a¤ects performance have proved elusive. Recently, Paravisini
and Schoar (2012) shows that by decreasing monitoring costs, IT reduces loan o¢ cers
agency costs. Our results complement their study by showing that IT increases loan
o¢ cers productivity by lowering their costs of acquiring soft information from their
peers.
Finally, this paper is also related to the recent strand of the literature that studies
the di¤erences in productivity performance between rms and plants within sectors and
across countries.5 Existing works in di¤erent elds have linked productivity levels to a
number of features of technology, demand, human capital and market structure. However,
as noted by Bloom and Reenen (2007) and Bloom and Reenen (2010), to create persistent
performance di¤erences the advantageous inner workings must be di¢ cult to imitate, and
this suggests that part of the performance variations across similar enterprises might be
due to other softer and more informal aspects of organizations. We contribute to this
literature by identifying another factor which signicantly a¤ects individual performance,
that is, the possibility of acquiring knowledge from others.
2 Empirical models and results
The foregoing discussion suggests that the o¢ cersperformances might be a¤ected by
several di¤erent factors such as branch characteristics and their access to information.
Because the estimation strategy is a¤ected by data availability, this section begins with
a description of the institutional background and the data.
5See Gibbons and Henderson (2010) and Gibbons (2010) for surveys of the literature on performance
di¤erences across similar enterprises.
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2.1 The Setting
We analyze the behavior of loan o¢ cers, also called relationship managers, in the
corporate banking division of a major Japanese bank (the Bank) during the two-year
period 2006-2008. Located across more than two hundred branches throughout Japan,
the o¢ cers primary tasks are to grant and manage loans to local enterprises. Their
performances are assessed every six months and are measured by the percentage of the
targets met during the same time. The o¢ cersperformance can be a¤ected by two main
factors. First, there exist regional di¤erences between branches, such as the local demand
for loans and the protability of local enterprises. Second, there is some heterogeneity in
loan tasks, in fact, while some o¢ cers only deal with the public administration, others
need to re-structure more protable loans or solicit loans from new clients. However, we
shall take into account these sources of heterogeneity among o¢ cers.
As explained in the introduction, one of the main di¤erences between a U.S. bank and
the Japanese bank we are analyzing is the incentive system. While end-of-year bonuses
are extensively adopted in the U.S. banking sector, the Bank rewards its loan o¢ cers
by means of promotion. We observe about two hundred instances of promotion in our
sample, and in untabulated results we also show suggestive evidence that the likelihood
of being promoted is positively associated with the loan o¢ cers information production
(e.g. number of answers posted) and negatively a¤ected by how much information o¢ cers
acquire (e.g. number of questions posted). This evidence, albeit not conclusive, suggests
that a signaling motive might be present.
By law, the Bank implements a switching rule as a way to prevent bribery and graft
among loan o¢ cers. This regulation obliges loan o¢ cers to change branches every two
to ve years, which allows us to disentangle the e¤ect of an individual branchs working
environment from the o¢ cers ability on productivity. We shall show that headquarters
do not relocate o¢ cers based upon their past performance.
In this environment, information sharing among loan o¢ cers has several e¤ects. First,
allowing o¢ cers to share information lets them better assess the riskiness of client enter-
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prises, or work on more projects at the same time. Second, it might allow the low-ability
workers to bridge the gap separating them from the most productive ones. Third, high-
skill workers might be required to devote a larger fraction of their time helping their
colleagues, which could reduce their performance. Fourth, anticipating that this can in-
crease their chances of being promoted, o¢ cers might share their knowledge with others
in order to signal their expertise in a particular eld. Our main contribution is to identify
and disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects that communication has on productivity.
We now discuss the features of this work environment that allow us to assess whether
information sharing shapes individual performance.
2.2 Data Characteristics
We collected data on performance, communication and information sharing from the
corporate banking division of a major Japanese bank. Our primary data source is the
banks personnel records. These include all loan o¢ cers, approximately 2800 people,
located across hundreds of branches in Japan. Branches vary in size and primary type
of business, mainly due to location. In general, metropolitan branches have more loan
o¢ cers between 30 and 100 and larger enterprises as customers, while those located
in suburban areas have fewer o¢ cers, about 10, and smaller businesses as customers.
Our data span October 2006 through September 2008. Prior to this study, only in the
local branch employing individual loan o¢ cers kept their performance data. Information
asymmetry made it di¢ cult for loan o¢ cers to observe each others productivity across
branches, likely increasing dispersion of individual output. Since the Bank had a major
merger in October 2005, we focus our attention on the stable, second year of the new bank
to avoid having merger activity inuence results via changes in o¢ cersperformances. The
strengths of the data lie in their ne-grained level of detail and the possibility of tracking
each o¢ cers performance over time.
Dependent Variable. Loan o¢ cers are reviewed semi-annually to assess their perfor-
mance. In order to account for branch location and task di¤erences, we control for the six
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main groups to which each o¢ cer may belong. These groups are: large existing account,
small existing account, loan restructuring, public sector, new strategic account, and new
non-strategic account. The main di¤erences among groups depend on the di¤erent clien-
tele. For example, o¢ cers working in the public sector group exclusively deal with public
administration, while o¢ cers in the restructuring group try to renegotiate underperform-
ing loans. Bank headquarters sets the targets for managers in these groups and to each
loan o¢ cer the head of the branch assigns a score of up to 80 percentage points based on
his quantitative measures and up to 20 percentage points based on qualitative measures
in the categories of Table 2.
Table 2: Output Metrics
Quantitative Qualitative
revenue
individual loan prot customer service
liquid deposit prot loan reinforcement
loan volume contribution to branch operations
reduced delinquencies contribution to organization operations
reduced estimated losses
bank gross prot
The dual sets of metrics help to increase accuracy relative to stochastic environmental
shocks. As reported by bank executives, the branch managers often assign qualitative
scores as a reward for major e¤ort that did not yield results or discount low e¤ort that
did. The weighted performance of loan o¢ cers along dimensions in the rst column
constitutes our objective performance measure, and weighted performance along the sec-
ond column constitutes our subjective performance measure. Results are robust to using
either column.
Our data include all targets, objective results, and subjective scores for each loan
o¢ cer in each group and for every branch. That is, we have all performance assessments
between 2006 and 2008 for the corporate division of the Bank. We believe that the
richness of our data and the fact that we need not rely on wage data to extrapolate
observed performance make it highly suitable for study of productivity di¤erences across
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o¢ cers.
In most of the analysis below, we focus our investigation on one dependent variable:
total performance. This is the total score assigned to o¢ cers, representing the weighted
sum of performance in each of the di¤erent categories and including the individual sub-
jective score. It also represents the performance metric used by the bank.
Independent Variables. The main variables of interest capture how loan o¢ cers use
the internal platform to share and gather information. We collected data on all accesses
to the information platform by each o¢ cer during the period of interest. Our data include
(i) the number of documents consulted by each o¢ cer, (ii) the number of questions posted,
and (iii) the number of answers provided, down to the second of access and across each
term.
Information provided by bank headquarters mainly concerns legal and taxation issues,
new nancial instruments and services provided by the organization, and general policy
guidelines as well as details about the most successful management practices to adopt.
The information exchanged by loan o¢ cers is more often related to clients, for exam-
ple, account management, credit worthiness, deal closure, collecting debts, and avoiding
defaults.
We also have information on the number of years the o¢ cer has worked for the Bank,
captured by the variable tenure, and whether he came directly from school with no
prior experience (or transferred from another bank), captured by the dummy variable
college.
2.3 Descriptives
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for our variables of interest, and two things are worth
noting. First, loan o¢ cers perform signicantly di¤erently, in fact, the mean of our main
measure of performance is 52, but the standard deviation is 21. Even if we focus on the
employees of the same bank, within the same region and with homogeneous tasks, we
still nd that their performance is heterogeneous. Second, loan o¢ cers seem to make
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great use of the available information within the organization. On average they access
569 documents, post 77 questions and provide 250 answers during a six-month period.
Moreover, the standard deviations of all three variables are quite high, ranging from 164
to 282. This will be relevant to interpret estimated coe¢ cients.
Our main hypothesis is that o¢ cers can access the information generated within the
Bank in order to improve their performance. In particular, we expect low performers to
ask more questions and provide fewer answers.
Figure 1 shows that the kernel density of our total performance measure. Note that
performance for below-the-median number of answers (above-the-median number of ques-
tions) is to the left of above-the-median number of answers (below-the-median number
of questions). The loan o¢ cers who help others more often, answering their questions,
on average perform better than the others. In contrast, the loan o¢ cers that ask more
questions are associated with lower performance. Table 4 conrms this intuition showing
the o¢ cersperformance for those who have shared information more or less than the
median o¢ cer. The rst column shows that there is no signicant di¤erence in perfor-
mance between o¢ cers who had access to greater or fewer numbers of documents than
the median. The second column, instead, shows that there exists a positive correlation
between the number of answers provided and performance. The loan o¢ cers who pro-
vide a higher number of answers perform signicantly better than the others. The third
column conrms this result showing that those who ask more questions, above the me-
dian, perform signicantly worse than the others. These results suggest that information
sharing is correlated with performance and with the o¢ cersinnate ability.
In the remainder of the paper, we present formal evidence to shed light on whether
these descriptive results are robust to controlling for other determinants of performance.
In doing so, we make precise the underlying identifying assumptions required to inter-
pret when this evidence is causal and present evidence in support of these identifying
assumptions.
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3 Information Sharing and Worker Performance
In this section we explain our approach and the methodology we employ to estimate the
e¤ect of communication and information sharing on performance.
3.1 Longitudinal Specications
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we estimate the e¤ect of information sharing
on loan o¢ cers employing a longitudinal model that allows us to control for unobserved
heterogeneity between branches and loan o¢ cers. Next, we take advantage of an anti-
corruption law that requires o¢ cers to switch branches every few years to identify the
causal e¤ect of information sharing on performance.
To identify whether information sharing a¤ects o¢ cer performance, we estimate the
following panel-data regression:
yi;j;k;t = 1I
a
i;j;k;t + 2I
g
i;j;k;t + 3I
p
i;j;k;t + t + k + j + i + 1Ti + 2Ci + "i;j;k;t (1)
where yi;j;k;t is o¢ cer is log performance in branch j in group k and during term t: The
main variables of interest are Ia; Ig; and Ip which capture the number of documents
consulted, questions posted and answers provided by o¢ cer i in branch j. The time xed
e¤ects t account for unobserved shocks that might have a¤ected both the o¢ cersper-
formance and their demand for information, such as those arising during a nancial crisis.
The group xed e¤ects k capture permanent productivity di¤erences across regions and
tasks, such as those arising from the di¤erent clientele and heterogeneity of loan types.
The branch xed e¤ects j allows us to control for permanent productivity di¤erences
across branches, such as those arising from a more protable location or a better head
manager of the branch. Finally, individual xed e¤ects i provides the possibility of con-
trolling for innate ability or motivation. We also include the tenure of the loan o¢ cer
Ti; when we do not include o¢ cersxed e¤ects and the dummy Ci which is equal to 1
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if the loan o¢ cer joined the bank right after college and equal to 0 if he had previous
experience in the banking sector.
We also note that information sharing and performance are unlikely to be identically
and independently distributed within a branch. We therefore adopt a conservative strat-
egy when estimating standard errors and allow the disturbance "ijkt to be clustered by
o¢ cer throughout.6
3.2 Instrumental Variable Specication
To better assess the causal e¤ect of communication and information sharing on perfor-
mance, we exploit the mandatory switching of loan o¢ cers across branches. Since there is
variation in usage of the information sharing platform across branches, we can construct
an instrument based upon the attitude of a given branch toward the new technology. For
each loan o¢ cer i; we construct an instrument Z i which is the amount of information
accessed in the previous branch excluding o¢ cer i: The choice of this instrument is moti-
vated by the idea that if o¢ cer A worked in a branch where problems are usually resolved
within the branch, without attempting to nd solutions elsewhere in the organization,
then even when o¢ cer A moves to a di¤erent branch, he will have been trained to com-
municate less with other loan o¢ cers. In contrast, if o¢ cer A worked for a branch where
the access to information provided by others is encouraged, he will carry that attitude
into the new branch. We construct similar instruments for each of our three endogenous
variables of interests: the number of documents accessed, the number of questions posted,
and the number of answers provided.
Formally, the rst stage for each endogenous variable e 2 fa; g; pg is represented by:
Iei;j;k;t = 1Z
a
 i;j;k;t + 2Z
g
 i;j;k;t + 3Z
p
 i;j;k;t + t + k + j + 1Ti + 2Ci + i;j;k;t
6Clustering the disturbance terms by branch leads to the standard errors on the parameters of interest
being considerably smaller than those we report.
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while the second stage is
yi;j;k;t = 1bIai;j;k;t + 2bIgi;j;k;t + 3bIpi;j;k;t + t + k + j + 1Ti + 2Ci + "i;j;k;t
where we have employed three instruments for the three endogenous variables. The
validity of this instrumental-variable procedure relies on the relevance of our instruments
and their exogeneity. First, we shall show that our methodology is not a¤ected by the
weak instrument problem, in fact, the coe¢ cients in the rst stage regressions for
each endogenous variable are highly signicant, and the F-Test is always above 10, the
standard threshold for weak instruments. Second, we have constructed our instruments
for o¢ cer i, excluding o¢ cer i from the computation of the information accessed in his
branch. This should reduce the correlation between the instrument and o¢ cer i0s innate
ability. However, since our instruments rely on variations in social norms across branches
we are afraid that o¢ cer i might have contributed to the branchs culture in the past,
which could bias our estimates. We address this concern by restricting attention to larger
branches (with more than 50 o¢ cers), for which this possibility is, at least, less likely.
Furthermore, to show that the exclusion restrictions hold, we shall show that the
assignment of o¢ cers to new branches is not a¤ected by their own past performance. In
particular, we show that the timing of their move across branches is not a function of
their productivity (e.g. o¢ cers are not rewarded by being moved to branches in larger
cities). Moreover, we also show that where the o¢ cers are going to be transferred to is not
inuenced by the productivity of the branch looking to locate an additional o¢ cer, that
is, we nd no evidence of cherry picking, e.g. the o¢ cers with the highest performance
being moved to the most (or the least) productive branches.
4 Baseline Results
Table 5 presents estimates of our baseline specication (1). The results show that the
pattern of unconditional di¤erences in worker performance by information sharing is
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robust to conditioning on a rich set of determinants of o¢ cer performance. It presents
estimates for the main parameter of interest showing that the number of documents and
the number of answers are positively correlated with individual performance, while the
number of questions is instead negatively correlated with their performance.
Furthermore, tenure signicantly a¤ects performance, which can be the result of a
learning process within the Bank. At the same time, joining the bank right after college,
without any previous experience, is positively correlated with performance. This result
can be interpreted as a result of the greater e¤ort exerted by new employees.
The main concern with these results is that information sharing and the e¤ect on
performance might be driven by other factors, such as a market downturn, a greater need
for information for a specic local market, or a result of a better performing branch. In
order to control for all this unobserved heterogeneity, as shown by column (4), we control
for time, group and branch xed e¤ects. Except for the e¤ect of the number of answers,
the other coe¢ cients are still economically and statistically signicant.
In column (5) we further control for the interaction of time and branch xed e¤ects,
which shows that the results are robust to this more restrictive specication. These re-
sults suggest that when o¢ cers increase the number of documents accessed, this has a
positive and signicant e¤ect on the productivity of the average worker, whereas increas-
ing the number of questions has a negative impact on his performance. The magnitude of
these e¤ects implies that when o¢ cers increase their information access by one standard
deviation it increases their performance by eleven percent. Similarly, an increase in the
number of questions is associated with a reduction in performance of about ve percent.
A concern with these results is that the estimation might be picking up heterogeneous
e¤ects that are unrelated to information sharing, in particular one of the main factors
for which we cannot directly control: o¢ cers ability. It is plausible that innate ability
has a signicant e¤ect, which would create a spurious correlation between information
sharing and performance. For example, it is likely that a loan o¢ cer who is able to close
a higher number of deals and identify the most protable ones will post fewer questions.
Then, observing a negative correlation between the number of questions and the o¢ -
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cersperformance might just be driven by heterogeneous innate ability or di¤erences in
training.
Column (6) of Table 5 therefore provides evidence on the e¤ects of communication and
information sharing on the productivity of the same worker. We exploit the longitudinal
nature of our data and control for individual xed e¤ects. In accord with the descriptive
evidence presented in the previous section, once we control for the individual xed e¤ects
as in column (5), the number of questions is not signicant anymore. However, we nd
an even stronger e¤ect for the number of documents. This correlation suggests that
performance could be signicantly a¤ected by the number of documents consulted by the
loan o¢ cers, even controlling for individual ability. As highlighted in the introduction,
we interpret this as evidence of the possibility that loan o¢ cers know more successful
management practices implemented elsewhere in the bank. We instrument this explicitly
in Section 5
4.1 Who Benets the Most from Information?
To explore whether the e¤ects of information sharing are heterogeneous across loan o¢ -
cers, we use quantile regression methods to estimate the conditional distribution of the
log of performance of loan o¢ cer i in branch j; and group k during the term t, yi;j;k;t, at
di¤erent quantiles, . We therefore estimate the following specication:
Quant (yi;j;k;tj) = 1Iai;j;k;t + 2Igi;j;k;t + 3Ipi;j;k;t + Xi;j;k;t + "i;j;k;t (2)
All variables are as previously dened, and bootstrapped standard errors, based on 1000
replications, are calculated throughout. The e¤ect of information access, gathering, and
production on o¢ cersperformance at the th conditional quantile of log performance is
measured by the vector :
Table 6 reports the estimates of  from the specication above at various quantiles,
controlling for tenure and experience as well as time, group and branch xed e¤ects.
Two points are of note. First, the e¤ect of information access is zero for the top two
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quantiles, and is positive and signicant at the bottom three quantiles. Second, the e¤ect
of information gathering as measured by the log of the number of questions posted is
negative and signicant for all quantiles. In particular, a ten percent increase in the
number of documents predicts a performance increase of at least twenty percent, whereas
the same increase in the number of questions posted predicts a decrease of more than
twenty-ve percent.
The data suggest that information access increases the performance of loan o¢ cers in
the left tail of the productivity distribution, while it has no signicant e¤ect on o¢ cers
performance in the right tail of the distribution. These results provide evidence that in-
formation transfers might help the low performing o¢ cers learn from the most productive
o¢ cers without disrupting the higher performers. That is, the learning e¤ect dominates
the substitution e¤ect.
This result has two implications. First, it suggests that in a distributed decision
polyarchy (see Sah and Stiglitz (1986)), like the setting investigated here, the agents
benet from communicating with each other due to the replicability of their decisions.
For example, two loan o¢ cers serving di¤erent clients might improve their productivity by
sharing information, because the protability of these loans is a¤ected by common factors
such as the credit market conditions and the available nancial products. Second, since
we do not observe any negative e¤ects on high-skill agentsproductivity, we can conclude
that these white-collar workers do not su¤er from the information overloadproblem
identied by Van Zandt (2004). This is probably due to the digital platforms ability to
disseminate reusable information without having high performers re-enter answers to the
same questions.
4.2 Soft Information and Productivity
Up to now we have found evidence that communication and information sharing might
help the low-performing o¢ cers acquire the necessary knowledge to improve their per-
formance. If this is true, we should then expect o¢ cers to signicantly increase their
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access to the available information when they switch branches. A loan o¢ cer might, for
example, start working in a di¤erent environment, with di¤erent existing customers, and
a di¤erent local credit market, which should have a signicant impact on his demand for
information. The switchers might then require information about the reliability of the
customers and the conditions o¤ered by competitors. We observe 618 loan o¢ cers who
switched branches, as prescribed by the anti-corruption law, after two years of experience
in the same branch.
As a rst step, we investigate whether or not Bank headquarters relocates o¢ cers to
di¤erent branches based upon their performance. On the one hand, it might be that in
order to improve the productivity of a branch with below-average productivity, the Bank
might nd it optimal to allocate the best o¢ cers to the branches that need to improve
their productivity. On the other hand, the high-performing o¢ cers might be rewarded
by being allocated to the bestbranches. Figure 2 favors the latter case. It displays the
slightly positive relation between the mean o¢ cersperformance before the switch and
the productivity of the branch where they work after the switch. This means that the
Bank does not employ the switching rule to strategically locate o¢ cers across branches
to improve branch productivity.
Table 7 reports coe¢ cient estimates on job rotation relative to document consump-
tion  indicator variable switch is equal to one when a loan o¢ cer moves from one
branch to another. As highlighted by columns (1) and (2) the results are consistent with
the learning hypothesis. Even controlling for time, group, branch and individual xed
e¤ects, the coe¢ cient is positive and both statistically and economically signicant. This
suggests that switching might be an important determinant of the demand for informa-
tion. Intuitively, the less-experienced o¢ cers would try to acquire a greater amount of
information, as shown by the coe¢ cients on tenure, negative but insignicant, and the
coe¢ cient on college, which is instead positive and signicant.
However, if the demand for information is driven by a temporary need driven by the
new environment, we should observe a diminishing e¤ect of switching over time. Columns
(3) and (4) investigate this issue, presenting the estimate for another indicator variable,
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after switch,which equals one for all terms after the switch. The e¤ect is still positive,
but no longer signicant. This conrms the hypothesis that switching has only a short-run
impact on the demand for information.
Since we have identied a signicant e¤ect of switching on communication, it is now
natural to investigate the level of costs associated with the application of this anti-
corruption law. In particular, we can investigate if switching has a positive or negative
e¤ect on the loan o¢ cersperformance. On the one hand, switching might result in the
o¢ cers exerting more e¤ort during the rst few months of the new appointment to signal
their ability. On the other, loan o¢ cers might have acquired some specic knowledge
about the type of rms and market conditions in the previous branch, which suggests
that after the switching they would need more time to learn work practices in other
environments.
Table 8 presents evidence that strongly supports the latter hypothesis. As shown
by columns (3) and (4), switching has a negative and signicant e¤ect on performance.
Moreover, this e¤ect is even stronger for longer-tenured o¢ cers, as suggested by the
negative coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the indicator variable and the o¢ cers
tenure.7 This means that even if loan o¢ cers might tend to work more when they are
forced to change branch, the overall impact on their performance is negative. As in the
case of the demand for information we should expect a decreasing e¤ect of switching on
the o¢ cersperformance over time. Column (5) shows the coe¢ cient estimates on the
indicator variable that accounts for all the time after the change of branch. Although
still signicantly negative, its magnitude is diminished.8
The last two columns (6) and (7) assure that these results are robust to the inclusion
of individual xed e¤ects. Overall this evidence suggests that implementing a switching
rule as a way to prevent bribery and corruption can impose high costs. In particular our
7Notice that this suggests that there is important soft information that get lost in the rotation across
branches. In fact, if the experience accumulated in one branch is very useful in another, then we should
nd that the shorter-tenured o¢ cers are more a¤ected by the rotation, while this is not the case.
8The negative e¤ect of relocation on performance can be driven by adjustment costs borne by the
loan o¢ cers, who have to adapt themselves to di¤erent branch social norms. However, at least part of
this is captured by the inclusion of the branch xed e¤ects, which should control for unobserved cultural
heterogeneity.
21
estimates suggest that some specialized human capital is destroyed when a loan o¢ cer
switches from one branch to another. In contrast to the existing literature on worker
displacement (which investigates the e¤ect of layo¤s on earnings), we are able to esti-
mate the e¤ect of turnover directly on performance. Moreover, we have the advantage of
analyzing a sample of white-collar workers that switch locations within the same orga-
nization, and with the same tasks. This guarantees that the negative shock to o¢ cers
performance is not driven by the relocation to a di¤erent rm or to a job that requires
another set of qualications.
Finally, a di¤erent way in which we can explain our results in table 8, is that incoming
o¢ cers get worse projects than incumbents. One plausible rationale is the following. One
can think that o¢ cers who worked in outstanding branches get tougher cases to handle.
Although, we do not nd the assumption that the performance of the various branches is
common knowledge among loan o¢ cers satisfying, we can exclude this possibility with a
di¤erent argument. In table 8 we show that the negative e¤ect on performance declines
over time. However, if the fact that the new o¢ cer has previously worked in a more
demanding environment motivates the type of projects assigned to him, he should always
get tougher projects. It would be suboptimal for the new branch to stop employing
his superior ability after few months. Moreover, in section 5.1 we further rule out this
hypothesis by analyzing the aggregate productivity of the branch before and after the
new loan o¢ cer joined the branch.
5 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Up to now, the evidence presented strongly suggests the existence of a signicant e¤ect
of communication on o¢ cersperformance. Specically, there is substitution between
the demand for information and the innate ability of o¢ cers. Moreover, low performers
or o¢ cers who just switched to a new branch signicantly increase their demand for
information. We can now address a natural endogeneity problem that can arise in our
context. The loan o¢ cer who is facing a market contraction, for example, can decide to
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acquire more information in order to improve his performance. Although in the previous
estimates we have accounted for a variety of unobserved shocks, with the inclusion of a
set of xed e¤ects, we now try to address this endogeneity issue in order to understand
whether we can interpret the results as causal or not.
Since we do not have data before adoption of the new technology, which allowed for
information to be shared, we are not able to run a natural experiment to understand
the e¤ect of information sharing on o¢ cersperformance. Nevertheless, we are able to
address this issue by employing the anti-corruption law as a source of exogenous variation.
For each o¢ cer i who switched from branch j at time t to branch j0 at time t+1; we use
the number of documents (as well as questions and answers) accessed in the branch j as
an instrument for the number of documents (and the number of questions and answers)
that o¢ cer i had access to in branch j0 at time t+ 1: That is, we exploit the variation in
branch attitudes toward information sharing to determine the e¤ect of communication on
performance. Then, we shall use the cross-sectional variation among switchers to identify
the e¤ect of communication on performance.
Table 9 presents the rst stage estimate for each one of the endogenous variables.
The rst column reports the coe¢ cient estimates of our instrument for the number of
documents, which shows that both the coe¢ cient (positive and statistically signicant at
the one percent level) and the F-test (above 10) strongly suggest that our instruments
are not weak. Columns (2) and (3) present the rst stage instruments for the number
of questions and the number of answers. As for the documents, our instruments seem
to signicantly a¤ect the demand for information. Intuitively, for all three variables of
interest, tenure has a negative and signicant e¤ect, which conrms that even restricting
attention only to the switchers; the more experienced people demand less information.
Given the small sample of switchers we are not able to control for branch xed e¤ects,
but we include both time and group xed e¤ects.
Table 10 presents the ordinary least-square estimates restricted to the switchers sam-
ple and the instrumental-variable estimates. The coe¢ cient on the number of documents
is negative and not signicant for all the OLS estimates while positive and highly signi-
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cant for the IV estimates. This can be interpreted as evidence in favor of our substitution
hypothesis, that is, high-ability o¢ cers tend to seek out less information than their col-
leagues. The magnitude is also interesting, in fact; the most conservative specication in
column (6) suggests an e¤ect of about ten percent on performance. This means that in-
centivizing the usage of the information produced by others within the same organization
might actually result in a signicant improvement in productivity.
Interestingly, Black and Lynch (1996) found that a 10% rise in average education,
roughly one year of schooling, led to an 8:5% productivity increase in manufacturing and
a 12:7% increase in non-manufacturing. The ten percent gain we nd in banking therefore
appears comparable to just under one year of education.
Our second variable of interest, the number of questions, has a negative e¤ect on per-
formance in both the OLS and IV estimates. This is consistent with the previous results,
and suggests that even the exogenous variation in the number of questions negatively
a¤ects performance. The magnitude is higher for our IV estimates than in the OLS re-
sults, ranging from ve percent to almost twenty percent. This conrms the substitution
between o¢ cersability and the number of questions posted.
Finally, in contrast to the panel estimates presented above, the number of answers
has a signicant, positive e¤ect on performance. These estimates show that the exoge-
nous variation in the number of answers has an impact on performance. However, the
coe¢ cients on both the number of questions and answers should be interpreted carefully
because, based on the panel analysis of the previous section, we know that these might
not be robust to the inclusion of individual xed e¤ects.
5.1 Discussion of the Exclusion Restrictions
The main concern with our instrument is that it might fail the exclusion restrictions.
There are three potential issues with our instrument: loan o¢ cer i might have an e¤ect
on the previous branchs social norm; the assignment of loan o¢ cers to branches is not
random, and the endogeneity of loan portfolios assignment to incoming o¢ cers. We
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devote this section to discuss how we can address each one of these concerns within our
empirical framework.
First, one might imagine that even if we do not include o¢ cer is demand for infor-
mation in the construction of our instrument, he might have had an e¤ect on the cultural
attitude of the branch regarding information sharing. However, this e¤ect should be more
pronounced for small branches than for larger branches. Table 11 shows that even when
we restrict attention to the subsample of branches with more than 50 loan o¢ cers, we
nd the same results. That is, the number of documents consulted and the number of
answers provided positively a¤ect performance, while the impact of the number of ques-
tions is negative. As expected given the lower number of observations, the estimates are
signicant only at the ve- and ten-percent level in the most conservative specication
shown in column (6). However, both the magnitudes and the signs are consistent with
the previous results.
Second, we have already shown in gure 2 that there is very small evidence of cherry
picking, e.g. the o¢ cers with the highest performance being moved to the most productive
branches. Even if this were the case, then we should expect the estimated e¤ect of switch-
ing on performance to be biased downward. This makes our result, that performance is
signicantly a¤ected after the rotation took place, even more striking. Furthermore,
we can test whether the timing of the o¢ cerstransfer across branches is a function of
their productivity, e.g. o¢ cers that underperform are more likely to be relocated in a
new branch. Table 12 shows that the likelihood of o¢ cer i being rotated is not signi-
cantly a¤ected by his past performance. Then, there is no evidence of the headquarters
strategically timing the rotation of the loan o¢ cers.
Third, one problem with the interpretation of our results might come from the pos-
sibility of incoming o¢ cers being assigned less desirable loan portfolios. We can address
this concern by investigating the aggregate branch productivity before and after a new
o¢ cer joined the branch. The test we perform is motivated by the following idea: it is
reasonable to assume that every branch has a certain ow of bad loans (which can uctu-
ate over time) determined, for instance, by the business cycle and the credit worthiness of
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the local rms, which ultimately determines the aggregate productivity of the branch. To
analyze if this bad loans are assigned to the incoming o¢ cers or not, we can analyze the
branch aggregate productivity before and after a new o¢ cer joins the branch. If there is
no drop in the branch productivity after the new o¢ cer joined the branch, then it is very
likely that the poor-performing loans are merely given to the incoming o¢ cer. This might
explain why loan o¢ cers tend to underperform in the new branch and try to compensate
this adverse loans assignment by increasing their demand for information. However, if
there is a signicant drop in productivity after the o¢ cer joined the branch, then this
suggests that indeed the incoming o¢ cers performance has been adversely a¤ected by
the rotation, which would suggest that specic human capital, such as the knowledge of
the local businesses and market conditions, has been destroyed.
The latter hypothesis is supported by the evidence presented in Table 13. It shows
that the productivity of the branches involved in the rotation is signicantly decreased,
once the incoming managers join the new o¢ ce. Specically, after controlling for time
and branch xed e¤ects, the branch productivity decreases on average by 7 percent as
shown in column (3). This reassures us that even if di¤erent o¢ cers get assigned di¤erent
rms, projects and loan applications to evaluate, there is no evidence of selection bias in
our estimates. In other words, the incoming loan o¢ cers reduced performance decrease
the productivity of the whole branch.
6 Implications
We devote the next section to implications of our empirical ndings for three strands of
literature. In the rst section, we consider theoretical and empirical results from tourna-
ment research that bear on information sharing incentives and thus group productivity.
We then analyze human capital ine¢ ciencies generated by the mandatory-transfer regu-
lation. Finally, we interpret our ndings in the context of existing studies on relational
banking.
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6.1 Information Sharing and Tournaments
If information sharing a¤ects productivity, an organizational design question arises as
to how promotion incentives interact with sharing incentives. Tournament theory, as
modeled by Lazear and Rosen (1981), models promotions as a relative game, that is,
prizes depend on relative rather than absolute performance. The compensation at one
level of the rm, in addition to motivating individuals at that level, motivates those at
lower levels.
These basic ideas of tournament theory have been extended in numerous ways.9 In
particular, Dye (1984) and Lazear (1989) consider how the potential for collusion, sab-
otage, or other forms of non-cooperative behavior counter the incentive value generated
by promotions and tournaments. Chan (1996) suggests that handicapping insiders in the
tournament, with respect to external hires, can help mitigate the possibility of inuence
activity or sabotage. Then, the existing theoretical literature has recognized the costs
and ine¢ ciencies generated by the implementation of a promotion-based incentive sys-
tem. Prendergast (1999) discusses the possibility that incentives from promotion methods
give rise to dysfunctional behavioral responses and that companies adjust management
compensation to address some of the negative responses from promotion incentives.
Empirically, many studies have conrmed these predictions from tournament theory.
Using a survey of Australian rms, for example, Drago and Garvey (1998) show that
individuals are less helpful and work harder when promotion incentives are strong. This
seems to suggest that workers incentivized via promotions are less willing to cooperate
with each other, because the e¤ort to help others may reduce their own probability of
being promoted.
In contrast to these observations, we nd that loan o¢ cers intensively cooperate
with each other, sharing their knowledge and in doing so they indirectly improve their
colleagues performance. This result seems to suggest that it is possible to reconcile
competitive promotion incentives with cooperation in knowledge-sharing. We attribute
9See Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a survey of this literature.
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this novel result to the relative weight placed on tenure in Japanese banking and to the
dual role of posting questions and providing answers. On the one hand, sharing informa-
tion with competitors can increase their chances of promotion via increased performance.
On the other hand, helping others signals skill and is recognized and rewarded by the
organization.
6.2 The Cost of Anti-Corruption Regulation
Corruption is recognized as a driving factor in persistent poverty in less-developed coun-
tries but also a source of ine¢ ciency and rent extraction in developed countries. The
World Bank ranks the ght against corruption as a top priority for poverty reduction.
Much theoretical work, since Becker and Stigler (1974) and Tirole (1986), focused on
understanding the incentives and the constraints within corruptible bureaucracies.10
Existing evidence, however, on anti-corruption policies shows that corruption is fought
and defeated with very simple tools. For example, Klitgaard (1991) describes successful
cases of corruption elimination, such as in the Hong Kong Police Force and the Singapore
Excise Department. The main factors were better monitoring and replacing individual
bad actors. Similarly, Olken (2007) analyzes a randomized eld experiment on reducing
corruption in Indonesia suggesting that traditional top-down monitoring can play an
important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly corrupt environment.
This gives rise to a more fundamental question: if these levers for eliminating corrup-
tion are within the choice set of governments, why are they not more often implemented?
A possible answer is suggested by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). They identify a trade-o¤
between market failures and government failures. That is, since preventing all corruption
is excessively costly, the second-best intervention may involve tolerating a certain fraction
of bureaucratic corruption. Then, government failures may indicate an unavoidable price
of dealing with market failures.
In our setting we do not directly observe corruption, but we are able to quantify the
cost associated with the anti-corruption regulation. If the implementation of the rotation
10See Banerjee and Mullainathan (2009) for a recent survey of this literature.
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rule has been e¢ cient, the social cost of enduring corruption should be higher than the
banking ine¢ ciencies generated by the remedial regulation. Then, we can infer the costs
of corruption by analyzing the productivity loss associated with the o¢ cersrelocation.
As a rst step, we collected loan o¢ cersperformance in dollar terms. On average each
o¢ cer generated almost four million dollars in bank gross prot every six months. Then,
as is shown by Table 8, and holding other factors constant, switching reduces performance
by more than 10%: This translates to a reduction in prots of 939,200 dollars a year for
each o¢ cer transferred.
From this, we can conclude that in two years the Bank passed up more than 200 million
dollars due to the adoption of this anti-corruption law. Since our data span only two years,
we cannot analyze potential long term productivity gains that might arise from exposure
to multiple branches. Yet, if corruption regulation has been optimally implemented, this
estimate would constitute a reasonable bound on the amount of corruption avoided due
to regulatory intervention.
6.3 Relational Banking
Boot (2000) denes relationship banking as the provision of nancial services by a nan-
cial intermediary on the basis of long-term investment in obtaining rm-specic informa-
tion through multiple interactions with diverse nancial services. Banks are interested in
relationship-based banking mainly for two reasons. First, the cost of information gather-
ing is reduced by learning through repeated transactions. Second, nancial contracts are
typically incomplete: banks and customers can build commitment and reputation through
repeated transactions across services. This banking model has been the predominant one
in Japan.11
The possibility for a bank to build a long-term relationship with a client enables col-
lection of soft information that is otherwise unavailable. The bond markets and the rating
agencies collect nancial disclosures, accounting reports, and default histories which can
11See Hoshi et al. (1990) and Hoshi et al. (1991) for an empirical analysis of the the role of banks in
Japan.
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be considered hard information. Banks collect information on the clients ability and his
honesty, which cannot be easily communicated to others Petersen and Rajan (1994).
Stein (2002) argues that larger, more hierarchical banks, where the decision maker
is further from the information collector, are more likely to rely on hard information,
because such organizations are expected to be less e¢ cient at making relationship loans.
Information in a large bank is potentially collected by one individual or group and a
decision made by another. Thus the decisions must be made on information that is easy
to transmit across physical or organizational distances. Consistent with this intuition,
Berger et al. (2005) nd that larger banks are more likely to lend to more customers at
a greater distance and communicate with the borrower more impersonally, i.e. by mail
or phone as opposed to face-to-face.
Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we show that information
sharing among relationship managers allows a large bank, like the one analyzed here,
to build long-term relationships with clients by reducing the costs of communicating
the soft information collected. The platform used by the Bank allows o¢ cers to store
the relevant information about diverse clients and to e¤ectively communicate this to
their colleagues. Second, we highlight the negative impact that breaking the relationship
between borrowers and loan o¢ cers has on the productivity of the latter, by showing that
loans o¢ cers signicantly underperform when they are relocated to a new branch.
7 Concluding Remarks
To address the question of whether access to information produced and gathered within
the same organization a¤ects the performance of loan o¢ cers, we examined two years of
micro data from a major Japanese bank. Data include all accesses to an information-
sharing platform, objective and subjective performance measures, and all job rotations
among more than 2,800 loan o¢ cers. Exogenous legal requirements, aimed at curbing
corruption by compulsory o¢ ce rotation, permit analysis of loan o¢ cer performance in
di¤erent settings.
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We nd that a standard deviation increase in the number of shared documents predicts
an 11% rise in output, in specications with time, location and individual xed e¤ects.
This is comparable to just under one year of education among non-manufacturing workers
Black and Lynch (1996). Quantile regression estimates suggest that communication and
information sharing greatly benets the low-performance o¢ cers. In fact, questions are
more salient among workers of lesser ability and, when productivity gains exist, they
appear strongly on the left tail of the distribution, at the 10th and 25th percentiles, but
do not appear on the right tail, at the 75th and 90th percentiles.
We also observe 618 instances of loan o¢ cers switching branches as a result of an
anti-corruption law. This exogenous shock provides an opportunity to observe the same
knowledge worker in di¤erent contexts. With this instrument, and controlling for un-
observed heterogeneity over time and branch, a standard deviation increase in shared
document consumption boosts productivity by at least 10%. These results appear to be
causal and enrich the growing literature on loan o¢ cersbehavior by highlighting the
importance of sharing soft information among o¢ cers, rather than directly acquiring it
from borrowers, in improving their productivity.
The di¤erence between OLS and IV specications provides evidence of the substitu-
tion hypothesis: high-ability o¢ cers demand less information than low-ability o¢ cers,
while low-ability o¢ cers can compensate for low independent performance by consuming
information provided by others. We also nd that switching jobs signicantly reduces
overall performance, possibly indicating destruction of job specic human capital such as
soft information about local businesses. The anti-corruption law should therefore avoid
economic losses from graft of at least this magnitude. Interestingly, o¢ cers of all abil-
ities increase their demand for information on switching jobs, which suggests that the
possibility to gather information within the Bank is an important instrument in increase
performance in the new environment.
A range of potential extensions is left for future research. It is important to under-
stand how information sharing and communication are related to the incentive system
in place. One could address this question by developing a similar analysis on micro data
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from a major U.S. bank, which should clarify if end-of-year bonuses and an incentive
system heavily based upon performance, a¤ects the information shared between white
collar workers. Moreover, it would be interesting to understand whether it is possible to
increase the ow of information within the organization by explicitly relating information
consumption to monetary incentives. Finally, we are also interested in the robustness of
our results with respect to the possibility of anonymously seeking and providing informa-
tion. On one hand, this could reduce embarrassment costs in requesting information and
increase the provision of novel but controversial ideas. On the other hand, the quality of
information could decrease due to lower signaling and reputation-building e¤ects. This
would enable tests of how incentives and reputation interact with organizational theories
of the rm.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Total Performance 52 48 8 110 21
Number Documents 569 522 102 1618 282
Number Questions 77 45 4 585 123
Number Answers 250 238 4 813 164
Tenure 10 11 0 32 5
Notes: entries are the summary statistics for our main variables of interest. "To-
tal Performance" is the sum of the objective and the subjective performance measures.
"Tenure" is the number of years managers worked for the Bank. On average each manager
obtains a score of 52 out of 100, downloads 569 documents, post 77 questions, and pro-
vides 250 answers over a six-month period. Overall there are 2451 manager-branch-term
observations.
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Table 4: Managers Performance by Information Sharing
Number Documents Number Answers Number Questions
Below the Median 52.603 50.356 53.919
(0.291) (0.294) (0.308)
Above the Median 52.025 54.438 50.727
(0.306) (0.306) (0.287)
Di¤erence 0.577 4.085*** -3.192***
(0.422) (0.420) (0.421)
Notes: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The standard errors
clustered by manager are reported in parenthesis. Performance is measured as the total
score assigned to a manager in a given branch.
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Table 5: Panel Model Fixed E¤ects Estimates
Log(Tot. Performance) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Number Documents) 0.0493*** 0.0562*** 0.0226** 0.0300*** 0.0216** 0.0374**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
Log(Number Questions) -0.0505*** -0.0335*** -0.0246*** -0.0217*** -0.0195*** -0.0104
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Log(Number Answers) 0.0508*** 0.00848 0.00533 0.00337 0.00475 -0.0062
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Tenure) 0.0632*** 0.0674*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.1000***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
College 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.105*** 0.0924*** 0.0891***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Branch Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES
Time * Branch Fixed E¤ects YES
Individual Fixed E¤ects YES
Observations 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805
R-squared 0.0629 0.0582 0.1567 0.3049 0.467 0.157
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of total performance. "College" is a dummy variable
equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. The time period is 2006-
2008. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under
coe¢ cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, group and
branch xed e¤ects. As additional controls Column (5) includes time dummies interacted
with branch dummies, while Column (6) includes individual xed e¤ects.
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Table 6: Quantile Regression Estimates
Log(Total Performance) 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Log(Number Documents) 0.0391** 0.0409*** 0.0250* 0.002 -0.012
(0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
Log(Number Questions) -0.0207*** -0.0251*** -0.0372*** -0.0361*** -0.0164***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(Number Answers) 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.0209** 0.006
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of total performance. All specications control for time,
group, and branch xed e¤ects.
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Table 7: E¤ect of Switching on Information Access
Log(Number Documents) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch 0.0199** 0.0218**
(0.009) (0.009)
After Switch 0.0125 0.0150*
(0.008) (0.008)
Log(Tenure) -0.0218 -0.0217
(0.014) (0.014)
College 0.278*** 0.279***
(0.042) (0.042)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Branch Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Individual Fixed E¤ects YES YES
R-squared 0.3342 0.347 0.334 0.346
Observations 10,055 10,055 10,055 10,055
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The depen-
dent variable in all columns is the log number of documents downloaded in a six-month
period. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under
coe¢ cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, group and
branch xed e¤ects. As additional controls Column (2) and (4) include individual xed
e¤ects. "Switch" is a dummy variable equal to one only in the rst term after the man-
agers relocation to another branch. "After Switch" equals one for all the terms after
the transfer. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank
directly after college.
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Table 8: E¤ect of Switching on Performance
Log(Total Performance) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Switch -0.111*** -0.0317 -0.118*** -0.0461* -0.108***
(0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013)
Switch*Tenure -0.00778*** -0.00726***
(0.002) (0.002)
After Switch -0.0889*** -0.0915***
(0.010) (0.012)
Log(Number Documents) 0.0470*** 0.0469*** 0.0287*** 0.0283*** 0.0274** 0.0387** 0.0348**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Log(Number Questions) -0.0515*** -0.0516*** -0.0210*** -0.0210*** -0.0205*** -0.00851 -0.0078
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Number Answers) 0.0569*** 0.0571*** 0.0059 0.00618 0.00476 -0.00394 -0.0052
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Tenure) 0.0636*** 0.0700*** 0.0994*** 0.105*** 0.0994***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
College 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.0915*** 0.0907*** 0.0897***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Branch Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Manager Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Observations 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805 9,805
R-squared 0.0698 0.0701 0.3078 0.308 0.3054 0.166 0.165
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of total performance. The estimation method in all
columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coe¢ cients in all columns are clustered
by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form).
Columns include a full set of time, group and branch xed e¤ects. As additional controls
Column (6) and (7) include individual xed e¤ects. "Switch" is a dummy variable equal to
one only in the rst term after the managers relocation to another branch. An interaction
term between "Switch" and "Tenure" is included in columns (2) and (4). "After Switch"
equals one for all the terms after the transfer. "College" is a dummy variable equal to
one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college.
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Table 9: First Stages
Documents Answers Questions
Documents Prev Branch 7.398*** -0.654* -0.214
(0.744) (0.362) (0.248)
Answers Prev Branch -14.439*** 4.190*** -1.637**
(2.282) (1.112) (0.757)
Questions Prev Branch 8.420*** 2.271** 7.437***
(2.157) (1.052) (0.718)
Tenure -10.419*** -4.132*** -2.688***
(2.622) (1.278) (0.873)
College 54.021 19.242 -2.409
(69.580) (33.915) (23.161)
F-Test 50.289 16.774 49.343
Time Fixed e¤ects YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES
Observations 618 618 618
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The dependent
variables are the number of documents, answers and questions in a six-month period after
the relocation. Standard errors in brackets under coe¢ cients in all columns are clustered
by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form).
Columns include a full set of time, and group xed e¤ects. "Documents Prev Branch" is
the average number of documents consulted within the branch before the relocation. Sim-
ilarly for "Answers Prev Branch" and "Questions Prev Branch". "College" is a dummy
variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Overall we
observe in our sample 618 managers switching branch.
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Table 10: IV Estimates
Total Performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Number Documents -0.00123 0.0197** -0.00138 0.0225*** -0.00347 0.0194**
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)
Number Questions -0.0306*** -0.133** -0.0287*** -0.104*** -0.0169** -0.0908***
(0.008) (0.061) (0.008) (0.034) (0.008) (0.033)
Number Answers 0.0175*** 0.112 0.0148** 0.0727** 0.0114* 0.0674**
(0.007) (0.080) (0.007) (0.036) (0.007) (0.034)
Tenure 0.387** 0.871** 0.385** 0.689*** 0.603*** 0.819***
(0.172) (0.382) (0.174) (0.242) (0.183) (0.223)
College -3.736 -7.538 -3.714 -6.748 -3.414 -6.015
(4.809) (6.436) (4.806) (5.74) (4.839) (5.544)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Observations 618 618 618 618 618 618
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. In all columns
the dependent variable is the managers total performance. "College" is a dummy variable
equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Standard errors in
brackets under coe¢ cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of
time, and group xed e¤ects. The estimation method in columns (1), (3), and (5) is OLS.
Columns (2), (4), and (6) are estimated using 2SLS. In both cases, we restrict attention
to our subsample of 618 managers switching branch.
Notice that, albeit signicant, we do not interpret causally the e¤ect of the "number
of questions" and the "number of answers" on performance. In fact, as shown by the
results in column (6) of table 5, these e¤ects would disappear if individual xed e¤ects
were added to the specication.
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Table 11: Robustness I: IV Estimates for Large Branches
Total Performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Number Documents 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.0129* 0.004 0.0156**
(0.005) (0.042) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Number Questions -0.0455*** 0.224 -0.0384*** -0.0422** -0.0199** -0.0377*
(0.009) (0.683) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.021)
Number Answers 0.0316*** -0.387 0.019 0.020 0.011 0.0392*
(0.011) (1.049) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.021)
Tenure 0.243 -0.039 0.211 0.269 0.603** 0.695**
(0.272) (1.100) (0.278) (0.269) (0.282) (0.286)
College -25.25*** -13.650 -22.65*** -24.11*** -19.94*** -23.44***
(7.129) (33.150) (6.421) (6.669) (7.420) (8.608)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. In all columns
the dependent variable is the managers total performance. Large branches are those
with more than 50 employees. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager
joined the Bank directly after college. Standard errors in brackets under coe¢ cients in
all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, and group xed e¤ects.
The estimation method in columns (1), (3), and (5) is OLS. Columns (2), (4), and (6)
are estimated using 2SLS. In both cases, we restrict attention to our subsample of 240
managers switching branch.
Notice that, albeit signicant, we do not interpret causally the e¤ect of the "number
of questions" on performance. In fact, as shown by the results in table 5, this e¤ect would
disappear if individual xed e¤ects were added to the specication.
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Table 12: Robustness II: Probability of Being Relocated and Past Performance
Switch (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tenure -0.00916*** -0.0129*** -0.0128*** -0.0139*** -0.0217*** -0.0314***
(0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0040)
Lag Productivity -0.00159* -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
College -0.0706 -0.0512 -0.0134 -0.0167
(0.0992) (0.0999) (0.1010) (0.1080)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES
Group Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Branch Fixed E¤ects YES
Observations 10,060 7,108 7,108 7,108 7,108 7,108 6,993
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. All columns
estimated by probit maximum likelihood. The dependent variable in all columns is a
dummy variable equal to one if the loan o¢ cer is relocated to another branch at time
t. "Lag Productivity" is the managerstotal performance recorded at t-1. All columns
include "Tenure" as control variable. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the
manager joined the Bank directly after college. Additional controls include time, group,
and branch xed e¤ects.
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Table 13: Robustness III: Branch Aggregate Productivity
Branch Productivity) (1) (2) (3)
Switch -75.85***-83.43***-7.174***
(11.47) (11.28) (1.854)
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES
Branch Fixed E¤ects YES
Observations 1129 1129 1129
R-squared 0.004 0.029 0.881
Notes: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. In all columns
the dependent variable is the branch aggregate quantitative productivity. "Switch" is a
dummy variable equal to one after an incoming manager joins the branch. The estimation
method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coe¢ cients in all columns
are clustered by branch (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown
form). Columns (2) include time xed e¤ects, while Column (3) include time and branch
xed e¤ects.
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Figure 1: The plot displays the kernel density estimation of Total Performance for man-
agers that provided an above (below) the median number of questions and answers. The
density estimates are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel.
Figure 2: The plot displays the relationship between the o¢ cersaverage performance
in the term before the relocation to another branch, and the average productivity of the
branch to where they are relocated. The tted values and the 95% condence interval
are reported.
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